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The National Government promised to reform the accident 
compensation scheme to make it fairer and more affordable. The 
result of this committment has been the Accident Rehabilitation 
and Compensation Insurance Act which came into force on 1 July 
1992. This paper compares the cover for medical misadventure 
under the new 1992 Act with the old Accident Compensation Act. 
This papers shows that the Government has not kept its promises 
regarding the cover for medical misadventure. The new scheme 
imposes more stringent requirements on the medical misadventure 
victim to get cover under the new Act than for other accident 
victims. Furthermore, in a signinficant number of cases which 
would have been eligible for compensation under the old Act are 
not eligible under the new Act. This limitation of cover in the 
case of medical misadventure is incomprehensible, particularly 
in view that between 1990 and 1991 medical misadventure cost $5 
million, which is 0.5% of the whole accident compensation 
payout. The medical misadventure provision in the new Act is, in 
effect, the reintroduction of medical negligence. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, 
bibliography and annexures) comprises approximately 14.000 
words. 
Medical Misadventure under the Accident Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Insurance Act: An improvement for the patient? 
I. Introduction 
Legislators all round the globe are having problems in finding a 
just and efficient system for compensating victims of medical 
accidents. 1) The main options considered to date are to find new 
common law doctrines, for example, strict liability in the doctor-
patient relationship, or to develop a whole new concept, for 
example, an insurance system based on compensation without fault. 
Since 1974 New Zealand has had a far-reaching no-fault insurance 
based scheme2) for compensating the victims of accidents (including 
medical accidents). 3) The purpose of which is to shift a fair share 
of the burden of an accident which suddenly falls upon an 
individual to the community. 4) In short, the system neither 
resembles traditional tort law responses5) nor does it operate like 
a social welfare system6): its insurance base makes it altogether 
different, and the extent of its cover (the Act applies equally to 
earners and non-earners) makes it unique. In the last few years 
significant criticism emerged about the fairness and affordability 
of the scheme as operated in New Zealand. The response to these 
criticism is the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance 
Act which came into force on 1 July 1992. The Government claims to 
have "taken a realistic approach to the problems of the Scheme, and 
1 Deutsch, Arztrecht und Arzneimittelrecht, 2nd ed. Berlin 
(1991), p.100 et seq.; Smith, Compensation for medical 
misadventure and drug injury in the New Zealand no-fault 
system, (1982) 284 BMJ, 1457(1457). 
2 Deutsch, Arztrecht und Arzneimittelrecht, 2nd ed. Berlin 
(1991), p.101; McGreevy, Accident Compensation Reform- A 
Fairer Scheme or a Breach of Contract?, Accident Compensation 
Reform Conference (materials), Wellington (1991), p.4. 
3 Compare: Sweden and other Skandinavian countries have 
implemented compensation schemes, which only provide cover 
for medical and pharmaceutical injuries. The schemes are 
based on voluntary group insurance agreements and have no 
statutory authority.- Vennell, Medical injury compensation 
under the New Zealand Accident Compensation Scheme, 
Professional Negligence 1989, 141(152). 
4 Royal Commission on Inquiry, Compensation for Personal Injury 
in New Zealand (Woodhouse Report) (1967), p.39 et seq .. 
5 That said, ideas of causation under the scheme have been 
borrowed from tort law: Dean v ACC, ACAA dee. 6/92, p.8. 
6 McGreevy, Accident Compensation Reform- A Fairer Scheme or a 
Breach of Contract?, Accident Compensation Reform Conference 
(materials), Wellington (1991), p.4. 
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the result will be a new system which is fairer, cost-effective, 
and sustainable". 7) In addition the Government stated that: "those 
who have received compensation in the past will continue to receive 
it in the future".8) 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the 1992 Act and consider how 
it compares with the previous legislation on the particular issue 
of cover for medical misadventure. This analysis will show that 
while the definition of medical misadventure under the old 
legislation allowed recovery for acts (including acts of omission) 
which were less than negligent, the new Act is restricted to 
negligence. In addition while the courts and the Appeal Authority 
had developed a reasonably consistent and workable definition of 
medical misadventure, the new legislation by virtue of a number of 
superfluous "clarfication" provisions creates the potential for 
confusion and uncertainty. 
II. History of the Accident Compensation Scheme 
Initial ideas about some form of absolute liability were addressed 
by O.C.Mazengarb Q.C. in his doctorate for his LLD (New Zealand) in 
19419) and A.A.Ehrenzweig who suggested a compensation scheme for 
victims of health care mishaps on a no-fault basis in 1951.lO) 
Mazengarb proposed a scheme for compensation with respect to motor 
accidents. However, no public demand for such a scheme of absolute 
liability was apparent in New Zealand at that time and it was not 
until 1962, when a Committee on Absolute Liability was set up to 
consider the issue of liability for motor accidents, that a no-
fault scheme was considered. The majority of the 1962 committee 
recommended an accident insurance scheme which would cover all 
persons who were injured in any way, without the need to prove 
7 Hon WF Birch, quoted after: McGreevy, Accident Compensation 
Reform- A Fairer Scheme or a Breach of Contract?, Accident 
Compensation Reform Conference (materials), Wellington 
(1991), p.l. 
8 Government, quoted after: Legislation Advisory Cowmittee, 
Submissions on the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation 
Insurance Bill to the Labour Select Committee, Wellington 
(1992), p.5. 
9 McLeod, Medical Malpractice in New Zealand, 220(235) in: 
Medical Malpractice, J.L.Taylor (ed) (1980). 
10 Ehrenzweig, Negligence without Fault, (1966) 54 Cal LR, 1422 
et seq .. 
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negligence. The committee, however, made the qualification that 
compensation must be provided so that the community could afford to 
carry the cost on an equitable basis. 11 ) Following discussion and 
the expressed dissatisfaction with the 1956 Workers' Compensation 
Act 12 ), a Royal Commission of Inquiry was set up by the Government 
in 1966. The Commission, having been principally charged with 
examining the workers' compensation scheme, took its cue from 
Direction 8 which gave it the power to examine "any associated 
matters that the Commission may deem to be relevant to the objects 
of the inquiry. 1113 ) The Commission's report 14 ) was presented to the 
Government on 13 December 1967. The Report noted that remedies for 
a personal injury were reminiscent of a lottery in that negligence 
proceedings provided inconsistent solutions for a small percentage 
of victims. It recommended a comprehensive public scheme of 
compensation for every person in New Zealand who suffered personal 
injury or death by accident. The corollary of this was that all 
actions for personal injury or death should be abolished. This 
recommendation was informed by five principles: community 
responsibility, comprehensive entitlement, complete rehabilitation, 
real compensation and administrative efficiency. 15) Parliament 
acted on the Report and on 20 October 1972, the Accident 
Compensation Act 1972 came into force. A subsequent amendment in 
1973 extended cover from earners to non-earners. The costs of the 
accident compensation scheme between 1972 and the mid 1980s were 
kept under control, but between 1985 and 1990 doubled dramatically 
(25% per annum between 1985 and 1990). In 1990, for the first time, 
the expenditure on the scheme exceeded $1 billion. 16 ) The scheme 
was no longer seen as being fair because 70% of all payments into 
the scheme were made by employers' contributions; whereas only 40 % 
of those payments were work-related. 17 ) Additionally, it was 
accepted that the scheme was being subjected to significant abuse 
11 McLeod, Medical Malpractice in New Zealand, 220(236) in: 
Medical Malpractice, J.L.Taylor (ed) (1980). 
12 That Act still remains in force for work injuries and 
occupational disease occuring prior to 1 April 1974. 
13 Royal Commission of Inquiry, Compensation for Personal Injury 
in New Zealand (Woodhouse Report) (1967), p.30 - hereafter 
Woodhouse Report. 
14 After its chairman Mr. Justice Woodhouse known as the 
Woodhouse Report. 
15 Woodhouse Report (1967), p.39 et seq .. 
16 Minister of Labour, Accident Compensation: A Fairer Scheme, 
Wellington (1991), p.1. 
17 Accident Compensation Corporation, Annual Report 1991, 
p.45,46. 
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by claimants. 18 ) The newly installed National Government decided to 
address these problems and introduced reforming legislation, in the 
shape of the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 
(ARCI), which came into force on 1 July 1992. This legislation was 
primarily intended to cut costs, to broaden the contributions base 
and to combat abuse. 
Obviously a key aspect of the practical operation of any accident 
compensation scheme is the definition of the circumstances which 
trigger the legislation's cover. The 1972 Act stipulated that the 
legislation applied to "personal injury by accident", but did not 
specifically refer to the notion of "medical misadventure". A 
definition of "medical misadventure" was orginally included in the 
1973 Amendment Act referred to above 19 ), but withdrawn to allow for 
further and fuller submissions on the matter. 20) This process 
resulted in the enactment of the Accident Compensation Amendment 
Act 1974, section 8 of which stated: 
"Personal injury by accident" -
" ( a) Includes-
( ii) Medical, surgical, dental, or first aid misadventure 11 • 21 ) 
Another important aspect of the 1974 legislation was the abolition 
in section 27 of all civil claims for damages arising directly or 
indirectly from personal injury by accident. The obvious 
18 Minister of Labour, Accident Compensation: A Fairer Scheme, 
Wellington (1991). 
19 The medico-legal committee, which had been set up according 
to the recommendation of the Woodhouse Report to examine the 
distinction between sickness or disease and injury be 
accident, did not use the term "medical, surgical, or first 
aid treatment, care, or attention" in their definition of 
personal injury by accident.- Collins, Medical Law in New 
Zealand, Wellington (1992), p.142,143. 
20 Collins, Medical Law in New Zealand, Wellington (1992), 
p.142. 
21 See sec.2 ACA 1982. The words were borrowed from the 
Australian National Compensation Bill 1974 where they had 
been included in an attempt to prevent actions for negligence 
against the medical profession.- Palmer, Accident 
Compensation in New Zealand: The first two Years in: The 
Welfare State Today, Wellington (1977), p.165(203). 
This amendment came into effect on 8 October 1974, whereas 
the Accident Compensation Scheme came into force on 1 April 
1974. It is interesting to note that though there the 
definition of personal injury by accident contained no 
specific reference to "medical misadventure", the ACC 
regarded "medical misadventure" to be embraced by the phrase 
"personal injury by accident".-Accident Compensation 
Commission, Medical Handbook (1974), p.37 et seq.; Collins, 
Medical Law in New Zealand, Wellington (1992), p.144. 
implication of this in the area of medical misadventure was that 
doctors could no longer be sued for what might be loosely called 
medical malpractice. 
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The amendment did not provide any definition of the key term 
"misadventure" and effectively left this task to the subsequent 
interpretation by the courts. The difficulties associated with this 
task we shall consider shortly. 
After the amendment in 1974 a number of further amendments were 
enacted over the next few years (indeed a new codifying Act was 
passed in 1982) 22 ) but none included a definition of medical 
misadventure. 
We have noted already, that the 1992 Act was primarily enacted to 
cut costs, to broaden the contributions base and to combat 
abuse. 23) However, the Act also attempted, for the first time in 
the history of New Zealand accident compensation legislation, to 
define the term "medical misadventure", section 5 ARCI providing: 
"Medical misadventure" means personal injury resulting from medical 
error or medical mishap: 11 24) 
The focus of the rest of the paper will be on the treatment of 
medical misadventure in the accident compensation legislation and 
the possible changes which the new definition in section 5 ARCI may 
well bring about. 
III. Medical misadventure: approaches to a comprehensive definition 
under the Accident Compensation Acts 1972 and 1982 
l. GENERAL DEVELOPMENT 
This section discusses the various approaches to comprehensive 
definition under the Accident Compensattion Acts 1972 and 1982. 25 ) 
22 Accident Compensation Act 1982, hereafter ACA 1982. 
23 Compare above. 
24 See for the complete sec.5 appendix. 
25 It is not possible to refer to every decision by the Accident 
Compensation Corporation, Review and Appeal Authorities 
relating to medical misadventure. The discussed cases are 
6 
Regarding the analys{s of the case law under the old regime, are 
two fundamental propositions. In examining the old Acts, these two 
arguments must always be borne in mind. Firstly, medical 
misadventure has never been used as a synonym for medical 
negligence. If that had been the intention of Parliament the word 
"negligence" would have been used instead of introducing the then 
non-legal phrase, "medical misadventure 1126 ). Secondly, the 
definition of the term "personal injury by accident" is qualified 
by the phrase medical misadventure, that is medical misadventure 
identifies the type of accident by which the claimant alleges to 
have suffered various personal injuries. 27 ) Thus, in cases of 
alleged medical misadventure the misadventure is not enough to show 
that the claimant is the victim of some medical misadventure, but 
in addition it must be shown that that medical misadventure has 
caused some personal injury. This point, which assumes great impact 
in failed sterilisation operation cases, has not been appreciated 
by commentators and judges. Instead, there have been attempts to 
interpret the phrase personal injury by accident, in the form of 
medical misadventure as one term. 28 ) 
There has never been any doubt that positive action to treat a 
patient which is negligent and which results in personal injury by 
accident is considered to be medical m{sadventure29 l. 
Unfortunately, the earlier cases drew a distinction between 
positive actions and omissions30). In Re Collier Blair J stated31 l: 
"Various definitions of "misadventure" were furnished to me. 
Without committing myself to any of them I will accept for the 
moment that a medical misadventure is a mischance or accident, 
unexpected and undesigned, related to medical treatment, and 
arising out of a lawful act." 
those which, the author considers to be most pertinent. See 
for a broader overview: Collins, Medical Law in New Zealand, 
Wellington (1992), p.265 et seq. - schedule 6. 
26 Compare: Blair J., Re Mrs.McR (1978) 1 NZAR, 567(570). 
27 Blair, Accident Compensation in New Zealand, 2nd ed. 
Wellington (1983), p.81. 
28 Compare: Hughes, Accident Compensation and Childbirth, [1981] 
NZLJ, 79(84)- the argument for that is the use of the 
expression "includes" in the definition. 
29 Giesen, International Malpractice Law, Ttibingen (1988), 
p.533. In addition, it was held that even acts which were 
merely intentional, though not negligent, causing injury are 
covered under the Act - G v Auckland Hospital Board [1976] 1 
NZLR, 638. 
30 Blair J., Re Collier (1976) 1 NZAR, 130(132). 
31 Blair J., Re Collier (1976) 1 NZAR, 130(132), emphasis added. 
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This meant that a patient who suffered personal injury due to an 
act of omission (whether negligent or otherwise) could not receive 
compensation under the Act. This was so on the ground that the 
patient suffered from the consequences of an underlying disease or 
bodily condition and that had not been caused nor altered by 
medical activity. The implication of this case was therefore clear; 
that medical misadventure sometimes covered more than, sometimes 
less than, medical negligence.3 2) 
In Re E33 l the meaning of medical misadventure was accepted as a 
starting point, but the Judge, sought to define the concept of 
medical misadventure further. His honour concluded that the 
definition of positive actions was so that the misadventure had to 
be "in the nature of medical error or medical mishap". 34 ) Medical 
error was understood as meaning 
"the failure of a person involved in the administering of medical 
aid, care or attention to observe a standard of care skill reaso-
nably to be expected of him in the circumstances". 35 ) 
Medical Mishap was described as 
"the situation when there is the intervention or intrusion into the 
administering of medical aid, care or attention of some unexpected 
and undesigned incident, event or circumstance, of a medical 
nature, that has harmful consequences to the patient". 36 ) 
Though it was emphasised earlier that medical misadventure should 
not be taken as a synonym for medical negligence, the approach 
adopted in Re E was to see medical misadventure as a part of those 
common law concepts which pertain to the standard of care expected 
from medical practitioners and the degree to which the undesired 
result was forseeable. In many cases these concepts became 
centra1. 37 l In addition, the approach adopted in Re E meant that no 
compensation was payable under the Act when the injury was an 
32 Blair J., Re Collier (1976) 1 NZAR, 130(131); Giesen, 
International Malpractice Law, Ttibingen (1988), p.534; 
Vennell, Medical Negligence and the Effect of the New 
Accident Compensation Scheme, ZVglRWiss (1981) 80, 
p.228(229,230). 
33 Re E [1978] ACC Reports- July, p.44. 
34 Re E [1978] ACC Reports- July, p.44(46). 
35 Re E [1978] ACC Reports- July, p.44(46). 
36 Re E [1978] ACC Reports- July, p.44(46,47). 
37 Collins, Medical Law in New Zealand, Wellington (1992), 
p.148. 
unsatisfactory outcome of a prudent and faultless medical 
treatment.38) 
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The approach developed by the Appeal Authority in Re Collier and Re 
~ was in effect adopted by the High Court. ACC v Auckland Hospital 
Board39 ), the first decision of the High Court regarding medical 
misadventure concerned a woman who had undergone a sterilisation. A 
technical problem in the operating forceps resulted in the failure 
of the tubal ligation and the woman became pregnant. No approach 
was taken by Speight J to alter the definition and abolish the 
influence of the common law. He supported the definitions advanced 
in Re E and Re Collier but said that the attempted extension in Re 
E40) "in no way improves on the ... expressions of Judge Blair [in 
Re Collier] 11 • 41 ) Speight J did suggest, however, (albeit in an 
obiter dictum) that no distinction should be made between acts of 
commission and acts of omission, when the act of omission was 
performed negligently or was a mishap. 42 ) Furthermore, he indicated 
what would not constitute medical misadventure: 43) 
"All treatment, whether medical or surgical, has a chance of being 
unsuccessful. There is an expected failure rate in all these 
matters and such failure may be because no matter how correct the 
treatment, nature does not always respond in the desired way. It 
would be quite beyond the intention or wording of the Accident 
Compensation Act that cover should be granted on the basis of 
personal injury by accident merely because treatment was not 100% 
effective. Certainty cannot be underwritten. It is in the nature of 
medical and surgical treatment that unexpected and abnormal 
consequences may follow to a greater or lesser degree depending 
upon the simplicity or sophistication of the treatment being 
undertaken. Where there is an unsatisfactory outcome of treatment 
which can be classified as merely within the normal range of 
medical or surgical failure attendant upon even the most felicitous 
treatment, it could not be held to be a misadventure." 
In short, if , on the one hand, a treatment (from an objective point 
of view) produced an unexpected, abnormal and rare consequence, 
outside the normal range of medical or surgical failure, then this 
would be seen as medical misadventure. On the other hand, failure 
of treatment to achieve the desired result, notwithstanding a 
proper standard of care and skill, is not misadventure if the 
patient, although not cured, was not any worse off than before or, 
38 Gellhorn, Medical Misadventure in New Zealand, (1988] 
Corn.L.Rev., 170(188(189)). 
39 [1980] 2 NZLR, 748. 
40 Re E [1978] ACC Reports- July, p.44(46). 
41 ACC v Auckland Hospital Board (1980] 2 NZLR, 748(751-31). 
42 ACC v Auckland Hospital Board (1980] 2 NZLR, 748(752-10). 
43 ACC v Auckland Hospital Board (1980] 2 NZLR, 748(751). 
., 
if any worse off, this was only so because nature had not responded 
to the treatment. 
In the instant case, the ACC's appeal was dismissed on the ground 
that the failure of the operation was caused by a mechanical and 
remediable fault which was not within an accepted failure rate. 44 ) 
In the light of the rulings up to that date, the ACC, in 1981, 
attempted to sununarize "medical misadventure" in its internal 
Guidelines. According to the sununary, medical misadventure was: 45 ) 
"a mischance or accident, unexpected and undesigned, relating to 
medical treatment and arising out of a lawful act 11 • 46 l 
This definition was said to embrace all cases with an 
"unsatisfactory outcome of treatment which can be classified as 
being outside the normal range of medical or surgical failure 11 • 47 l 
It was also emphasised that "an act of omission, for example in 
failing to respond to a call for treatment", would not be 
included. 48 ) From this it could be argued e contrario that an 
omission of treatment due to mis-diagnosis was now covered by the 
Act, if the omission could be classified as not being in the normal 
range of medical or surgical failure, since the example chosen to 
show what would not be caught by the Act embraced a very small 
category of cases. In doing so, the Commission effectively adopted 
Speight J's obiter dictum as the governing law and disregarded the 
approach in Re E and Re Collier on this point. This point of view 
was confirmed in Re Carroll.49) 
The second High Court decision50) five years after ACC v Auckland 
Hospital Board, concerned a plaintiff who had undergone an 
operation for a malignant ovarian tumor. An adverse consequence 
developed, namely a fistula, which in the view of the operating 
surgeon was a surprising and extraordinary event. The chance of a 
fistula developing in this case was about 1%. The Accident 
Compensation Appeal Authority (ACAA ) held that it was not uncommon 
that an operation like this could lead to the development of a 
fistula, however carefully it was performed, and thus no medical 
44 ACC v Auckland Hospital Board [1980] 2 NZLR, 748(753-35). 
45 Guideline [1981] NZACR, 244. 
46 Compare: Re Collier above p.6. 
47 Guideline [1981] NZACR, 244. 
48 Guideline [1981] NZACR, 244. 
49 Compare: Re Carroll (1984) 4 NZAR, 335(338,339). 
50 MacDonald v ACC (1985) 5 NZAR, 276. 
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misadventure had occurred. 51 ) In the High Court Bisson J, reviewed 
the definition of medical misadventure taking all of the previous 
approaches into account. In addition, he observed the derivation of 
the word misadventure from the French word mesavenir, meaning "to 
turn out badly". In his view: 
"if sickness or injury calls for medical, surgical, dental or first 
aid treatment and II things turn out badly II for the sufferer of 
such sickness or injury then the Act affords cover because of his 
or her misadventure 11 .52) 
The significance of this definition is threefold: first, it is a 
change from an objective definition relating to the rare 
consequences53 ), to a subjective one which refers to the victim's 
point of view. Second, this was the first definition in which no 
difference between acts and onunissions was clearly made. Third, 
instead of concentrating upon the conunon law concepts of the 
standard of care and foreseeability as had been done in Re E54 ), 
his honour focused upon the natural and ordinary meaning of the 
word misadventure. 55 ) In doing so, a significant advance was made 
towards a broader definition of medical misadventure. 
In Viggars v Acc 56 ) Tompkins J introduced another aspect. His 
honour said that it was not important to review the statistics 
regarding the possibility of the occurance of an adverse 
consequence57 ) but rather that it was necessary to view each case 
individually.58) His honour also supplemented the definition of 
Bisson Jin MacDonald v Acc59): 
"the essential question is whether the event that occurred was so 
unusual and unlikely that it could properly be described as 
mischance or bad fortune".60) 
51 ACAA (1985) 5 NZAR, 146(151). 
52 MacDonald v ACC (1985) 5 NZAR, 276(279). 
53 See ACC v Auckland Hospital Board [1980] 2 NZLR, 748(751), 
compare p.8. 
54 See p.7. 
55 MacDonald v ACC (1985) 5 NZAR, 276(282,283). 
56 (1986) 6 NZAR, 235. 
57 Compare: ACC v Auckland Hospital Board [1980] 2 NZLR, 
748(751)- 3,4. 
58 Viggars v ACC (1986) 6 NZAR, 235(239). 
59 See above. 
60 Viggars v ACC (1986) 6 NZAR, 235(239). 
The ACAA in a resume of the three High Court decisions mentioned 
above regards medical misadventure as:6 1) 
1. Medical negligence or medical error; 
2. A totally unforeseen adverse consequence of medical treatment; 
3. An adverse consequence of such treatment which is outside the 
normal range of medical or surgical failure attendant upon such 
treatment. 
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However, an adverse consequence of such treatment which is within 
the normal range of medical or surgical failure attendant upon such 
treatment is not medical misadventure. 
This definition does not emphasise the victim's point of view and 
to this extent it departs from the approach taken by Bisson J 
emphasised in MacDonald v ACc. 62 ) This may have been the reason why 
in the case Gregg v Acc63 ) the appeal by the claimant was dismissed 
even though there was only a 0.3% risk of dying during the tests to 
determine the diagnosis. In his judgement Willis J conceded that 
the patient's death was a rare occurrence64), but in this 
particular case his honour accepted the relevance of the 
possibilities of treatment and diagnosis. 65 ) It is difficult to 
understand these findings. What could be more unexpected for a 
patient than death during diagnosis? This case appears to be a 
throwback to the common law categories of standard of care and 
foreseeability. 66 ) In contrast to this decision and in accordance 
with Bisson J's approach in MacDonald v Acc67 ), Middleton J. found 
in Re Scholten68), that in the eyes of a 32 year old woman the 
resulting inability to bear children was bad-fortune. 69 ) The fact 
that the patient's point of view should be a decisive factor in the 
decision has been clearly endorsed in the only decision of the 
Court of Appeal regarding medical misadventure, Green v 
Matheson . 70) The Court described medical misadventure as follows: 
insufficient or wrong treatment, failure to inform, mis-diagnosis, 
61 Re P, ACAA dec.2/89, p.6. 
62 See above. 
63 ACAA dee. 121/87. 
64 Re Gregg ACAA dee. 121/87, p.5. 
65 Re Gregg ACAA dee. 121/87, p.5. 
66 Compare: Re E above p.7. 
67 See above. 
68 Scholten v ACC, ACAA dee. 146/89. 
69 Scholten v ACC, ACAA dee. 146/89, p.7,8. 
70 Green v Matheson [1989] 3 NZLR, 564(572-38,57)- The issue the 
Court of Appeal was called upon to resolve was whether the 
respondent's claim for general and aggravated damages was 
barred by sec 27 ACA No.181 (1982)- see Collins, Medical Law 
in New Zealand, Wellington (1992), p.15 et seq .. 
misrepresentation (innocent or fraudulent), administrative 
shortcomings. 71 ) Apart from these, the Court of Appeal did not 
expressly adopt any of the definitions applied by the earlier High 
Court decisions. 
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Almost one year later Holland Jin Polansky v ACc72 ) appeared to 
depart from the previous High Court decisions. This case involved a 
woman who had undergone a series of tests to find the cause of 
continued gastric pain, urinary symptoms, loss of weight and 
anaemia. It was concluded by the surgeon conducting the tests (as 
well as other medical experts) that the appellant had a carcinoma. 
Surgery was performed during which the appellant's stomach and 
other organs were removed. It was only after the operation that it 
was found that there had been no carcinoma and that the appellant's 
condition might have been treated without surgery. The surgeon's 
decision to operate was considered to be acceptable as it was "what 
any prudent surgeon would have done 11 •73 ) In Holland's J opinion the 
description of medical misadventure as something which, from the · 
patient's point of view, "turns out badly1174 ) went too far because 
every undesirable result of a treatment would be considered a 
medical misadventure 75 ). He also disagreed with Tompkins J's view 
that the Act covered the case in which uneventfully an arteriogram 
carried out to recognised standards of medical treatment caused a 
stroke. 76 ) His honour's preferred view of what constitutes medical 
misadventure was the following: 77 ) 
"In my view the word misadventure in its context connotes the 
concept of something which should not have happened in the course 
of medical or surgical treatment and not merely an unfortunate 
result". 
Relating this analysis to the case in hand Holland J pointed 
out: 78) "The stomach and other parts should not have been removed. 
Likewise, the mis-diagnosis was an error [in the course of the 
71 Green v Matheson [1989] 3 NZLR, 564(573-1). 
72 Polansky v ACC [1990] 9 NZAR, 481. 
73 Polansky v ACC [1990] 9 NZAR, 481. 
74 Bisson Jin MacDonald v ACC (1985) 5 NZAR, 276(279), see 
above p.9. 
75 Holland J, Polansky v ACC (1990) 9 NZAR, 481(487,488). 
76 See Viggars v ACC (1986) 6 NZAR, 235(239)- Holland J, 
Polansky v ACC [1990] 9 NZAR, 481(488). 
77 Polansky v ACC [1990] 9 NZAR, 481(488). 
78 Polansky v ACC [1990] 9 NZAR, 481(488). 
treatment]. As such it should not have happened". Mrs.Polansky's 
appeal was therefore allowed. 
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Blackwood J as delegate of the Accident Compensation Appeal 
Authority attempted to clarify the meaning of medical misadventure 
after the Polansky case. He proceeded on the assumption that he was 
bound by the decision79) since Holland J had examined and analysed 
the three previous High Court decisions. Blackwood himself made the 
following suggestion as to what does and what does not constitute a 
medical misadventure in Re Hazel:80) 
1. Medical negligence or medical error causing injury to a patient 
is medical misadventure. 
2. If something happens which should not have happened during the 
course of medical or surgical treatment resulting in injury to the 
patient then that is medical misadventure. 
3. An adverse consequence of medical or surgical treatment where 
the medical or surgical treatment has been carried out properly and 
uneventfully and according to recognised standards does not 
constitute medical misadventure. 
Many doubts arose regarding this definition. The view has been 
taken that under clause 3 of Blackwood's definition not even Mrs. 
Polansky would have received compensation under the Act for her 
1nJuries since her treatment had been carried out properly in 
accordance with recognised standards. 81 ) There would not have been 
any compensation either for injuries suffered by the two claimants 
in the cases of MacDonald v ACC and Viggars v ACC. In the author's 
view the criticism of Blackwood's definition is not justified. If 
one reads Blackwood's definition objectively and with the 
statements of Holland J. in Polansky v Acc82 ) in mind this 
definition is only a refinememt of the former definition of medical 
misadventure. 83 ) The criticism disregards the fact that there is no 
"unless" between clause 2 and 3. Therefore, the refinement of the 
medical misadventure definition after Re Hazel is that medical 
misadventure only can be established if something happened during 
the treatment which should not have happened; an severe outcome 
79 Re Hazel, ACAA dee. 100/91 p.9; also Re Child, ACAA dee. 
130/91 p.15. 
80 Re Hazel, ACAA dee. 100/91 p.9; also Re Child, ACAA dee. 
130/91 p.16. 
81 Collins, Medical Law in New Zealand, Wellington (1992), 
p.158. 
82 Polansky v ACC [1990] 9 NZAR, 481(488), see above. 
83 Cartwright Jin Fletcher v ACC, ACAA dee. 18/92 p.6. 
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itself is not sufficient. 84 ) The emphasis has been shifted from the 
result of the treatment to the process of treatment. According to 
this interpretation Mrs.Polansky would have been able to get cover 
under the Act. 
Much of the criticism was also based on Blackwood's assumption of 
being bound by Polansky.SS) On this point, the critics were surely 
on stronger ground. As Middleton Jin Re Johns stated, that "each 
of the High Court decisions must be of equal persuasion before this 
Authority ... 11 .86) In fact, some later Authority decisions have 
adopted the pre-Polansky definition of medical misadventure.
87 ) 
Indeed, while others have attempted to incorporate aspects of the 
Polansky decision into the pre-Polansky definition.
88 ) As regards 
the latter, it has been argued that after Polansky the emphasis 
should be on the unfortunate events in the course of treatment 
rather than solely on the unexpected or unfortunate result.
89 ) For 
example, Mr.Cartwright understood the outcome of Polansky v ACC in 
Heberley v Acc90) as applying 
"a hindsight test by reference to an identifiably wrong result, 
without or irrespective of any element of fault rather than merely 
an unfortunate result or whether the manner of performance of the 
medical procedure in question was negligent or in error
11
•
91 ) 
84 Compare Blackwood itself in: Re McMullen, ACAA dee. 220/92 
p.7,8. 
85 Re Hazel, ACAA dee. 100/91 p.9; also Re Child, ACAA dee. 
130/91 p.15. 
86 Johns v ACC, ACAA dee. 354/91 p.5 
87 Re P, ACAA dee. 2/89 p.6; Samuels v ACC, ACAA dee. 33/92; In 
a later decision Blackwood J himself returned to this 
definition, on the ground that "it is undesirable ... that 
there should be such divergences of opinion in this 
jurisdiction. Therefore his honour acknowledged that an 
adverse consequence of medical or surgical failure attendant 
upon such treatment is medical misadventure.- McMullen v ACC, 
ACAA dee. 220/92 p.7 et seq.; see p.12 et seq .. 
88 Neilson v ACC, ACAA dee. 91/92 p.4,5; this comes back to the 
decision of Speight Jin ACC v Auckland Hospital Board (1980] 
2 NZLR, 748, where Speight J held that" it would be quite 
beyond the intention or wording of the Accident Compensation 
Act that cover should be granted on the basis of personal 
injury by accident merely because treatment was not 100% 
effective" (p.751), see also p.12 et seq .. 
89 Seen.above. 
90 Heberley v ACC, ACAA dee. 61/92. 
91 Heberley v ACC, ACAA dee. 61/92 p.22; Ponifasio v ACC, ACAA 
dee. 146/92 p.18; see Denning LJ in Roe v Ministry of Health 
[1954] 2 All ER 131(137) (CA). 
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In summary,the current position regarding the definition of medical 
misadventure is to use the pre-Polansky definition and either to 
incorporate aspects of the Polansky decision into it or use it on 
its own. 
2. SPECIAL CASES 
Before comparing the definition of medical misadventure under the 
ACA 1982 with that under the ARCI 1992, it is necessary to focus on 
a number of special cases which posed particular difficulty under 
the 1982 Act or which show the development of the term. 
a. Omission of treatment 
We have seen that originally, the omission of a medical treatment 
or the omission of an act during the medical treatment did not 
constitute medical misadventure92 ). The argument was that the 
patients suffered from the consequences of an underlying disease or 
bodily condition that was not caused nor altered by medical 
activity.93) Later it was assumed that at least omissions which 
were negligent or a mishap would be covered under the ACA.
94 ) The 
definition of Bisson Jin MacDonald v Acc95 ) abolished the 
difference between acts and ommissions almost completely. The only 
case in which it remains doubtful as to whether there is cover 
under the ACA 1982, is when the failure to provide treatment is not 
due to negligence.96) 
b. Informed Consent 
92 See Blair J., Re Collier (1976) 1 NZAR, 130(132)- see p.7. 
93 See p.7 et seq .. 
94 Obiter dictum of Speight J. in ACC v Auckland Hospital Board 
[1980] 2 NZLR, 748(752-10); ACC Guideline [1981] NZACR, 244; 
Re Carroll (1984) 4 NZAR, 335(338,339). 
95 (1985) 5 NZAR, 276. 
96 Compare: Keith, Compensation and Accountability, London 
13.05.1991, p.7 - but see also Green v Matheson where the 
Court of Appeal held that medical misadventure can occur 
because of administrative short-commings ( [1989] 3 NZLR, 
564(573-1), see p.11 ). 
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According to the House of Lords in Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital 
Governors and others97 ) where a doctor fails to inform his/her 
patient of the risks inherent in the treatment recommended by 
him/her and a responsible body of medical opinion would recognize 
it as proper practice to so inform, then it is open to the patient 
to sue the doctor for negligence. 98 ) In the New Zealand, the 
analogous problem has been: does the failure of the doctor to 
obtain informed consent to a particular procedure amount to medical 
misadventure? Until 1990 the view of the ACC and ACAA was that the 
doctrine of informed consent99 ) has no part to play in New 
Zealand's accident compensation scheme. The argument was "that 
Parliament could not have intended that a patient who gave proper 
consent should be deprived of cover while a patient who did not 
should obtain cover".lOO) If the patient had asked the doctor a 
specific question about the risks of treatment, then and only then 
was the doctor under a duty to inform the patient and when this was 
not done correctly there was medical misadventure. 101) That meant 
that patients who were less confident in their dealings with the 
medical profession or less able to ask the right questions were 
discriminated against. 
This approach was disapproved in H v ACC. The facts again involved 
a sterilisation operation. The operation failed and the female 
claimant became pregnant. The surgeon had not informed her before 
the operation of the chance that the operation could fail. He had 
also neglected to answer the patient's question as to whether or 
not she should continue take contraceptives. Mr.Cartwright of the 
ACC Appeal Authority held that the judgment of Sidaway v Bethlehem 
Royal Hospital Governors l0 2) was particularly persuasive. 103) He 
97 [1985] 1 All ER, 643. 
98 Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors and others [1985] 
1 All ER, 643(658f-h, 659 c,d). 
99 The origin of the term informed consent is attributed to 
Canterbury v Spence [1972] 464 F 2nd 772- compare: Collins, 
Submissions from the Medical Defense Union to Parliament's 
Select Committee on Labour concerning the Accident 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Bill, Wellington 
(1992), p.12. 
100 H v ACC, [1990] 8 NZAR, 289(296). 
101 Smith v Auckland Hospital Board [1965] NZLR 191(205) (CA); Re 
Priestley [1984] NZACR, 787. 
102 It was held that a doctor does not act negligently if he has 
acted concerning warning and risks of the treatmemt in 
accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a 
responsible body of medical opinion: Sidaway v Bethlem Royal 
Hospital Governors and others [1985] 1 All ER, 643(658f-
h, 659c/d). 
103 H v ACC [1990] 8 NZAR, 289(304). 
applied the Sidaway test in the instant case and held that a duty 
of care was owed by the surgeon to inform the woman before the 
operation of the risks of failure of the operative procedure and 
concluded that a negligent omission to do this constitutes medical 
misadventure. 104) However, the appeal failed on this point because 
Mr.Cartwright held there was no causal link between the failure to 
inform and the pregnancy; it had been established that the woman 
would not have refused to undergo the sterilisation procedure even 
if she had known of the slight risk that the procedure could 
fail. 105) The appeal was upheld on the ground namely that the 
surgeon did not answer the woman's question correctly. 10
6) The 
approach of Mr.Cartwright in this case shows that a doctor's 
failure to warn or provide information in accordance with the 
Sidaway test may well be regarded as medical misadventure.
107) In 
Re Hazel Blackwood J. followed Mr.Cartwright's analysis and 
concluded: 108) 
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ttA doctor may have a duty to inform a patient prior to treatment of 
the risks associated with that treatment depending upon practice 
accepted at the time as being proper by a responsible body of 
medical opinion.tt 
c. Sterilisation Operation Cases 
Pregnancies, resulting from unsuccessful sterilisation operations, 
have formed a significant number of decisions under the ACA. 
Problems in accepting the failure of sterilisation as medical 
misadventure have arisen related to the question of rare or adverse 
consequencesl09) (the failure rate lies about 1%) and the question 
of informed consent. 11 0) The real fundamental issue, however, 
raised by these cases is whether pregnancy can be regarded as 
personal injury. 
104 H v ACC [1990] 8 NZAR, 289(305,306). 
105 H v ACC [1990] 8 NZAR, 289(306). 
106 See Smith v Auckland Hospital Board [1965] NZLR, 191(205) 
(CA); H v ACC [1990] NZAR, 289(310). 
107 See Re Hazel, ACAA dee. 100/91 p.11; see Green v Matheson 
(CA) [1989] 3 NZLR, 564(572,573) where the Court of Appeal 
expresses no doubt that medical misadventure can apply by a 
failure to inform; Manning, Tort, [1991] NZ Recent Law 
Review, 65(79). 
108 Re Hazel, ACAA dee. 100/91 p.11. 
109 For example: Re M (1984) 4 NZAR, 339(340); H v ACC [1990] 8 
NZAR, 289(301 et seq.). 
110 See above. 
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The first case, Mrs.S v Acc 111 ), was not argued as a medical 
misadventure case but as personal injury by accident. The judge 
found that the process of conception, per se, was not an accident 
within the terms of the ACA112 ) and therefore dismissed the appeal. 
In Re Mrs.McR, Blair J. held that an unexpected and unwanted 
pregnancy following a sterilisation operation was not in itself 
evidence of an accident. 113 ) In this particular case, however, the 
failure of sterilisation was found to be due to medical 
misadventure and therefore personal injury by accident.
114 ) In Re 
Mrs.McR the delegate of the Accident Compensation Corporation 
argued that pregnancy was a natural physiological process which as 
such could not be regarded as an injury. 115 ) In contrast, Blair J 
took the view that the injury to Mrs.McR was that she became 
pregnant because of the failure of the operation. 116 ) Blair J. did 
not analyse the term personal injury itself. He regarded "personal 
injury by accident" as one phrase (which should be seen as a 
whole). In cases concerning "medical misadventure" this phrase has 
to be read then as personal injury by medical misadventure.
117 ) 
Pregnancy is undoubtedly a natural process and as such does not fit 
into the categories of physical or mental harm. In addition, it is 
certainly not an illness. Thus pregnancies which result from 
medical misadventure may well satisfy the "by accident" 
requirement, but hardly satisfy the "personal injury" test, at 
first blush. When the defintion of injury set out in the Shorter 
Oxford Dictionary is considered, the possibility of seeing 
pregnancy as an injury becomes more apparent. Injury is defined 
there as: 
11 Wrongful action or treatment; violation or infringement of 
another's rights. 11 118) 
The right which could be infringed in the case of an unwanted 
pregnancy is the woman's right of self-determination, an aspect of 
111 (1977) 1 NZAR, 297. 
112 Mrs.S v ACC (1977) 1 NZAR, 297. 
113 Re Mrs.McR (1978) 1 NZAR, 567(572). 
114 Re Mrs.McR (1978) 1 NZAR, 567(572,573). This decision was 
upheld by the High Court and is known as ACC v Auckland 
Hospital Board. 
115 Re Mrs.McR (1978) 1 NZAR, 567(572). 
116 Re Mrs.McR (1978) 1 NZAR, 567(573). 
117 Compare: Blair, Accident Compensation in New Zealand, 2nd ed. 
Wellington (1983), p.81; Hughes, Accident Compensation and 
Childbirth, [1981] NZLJ, 79(84); see p.6. 
118 Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 3rd ed. Oxford (1973), volume I. 
which is the right of family planning. It is questionable if this 
is a right which can be recognized under the Accident Compensation 
Scheme. The right family planning is not recognized as a right in 
tort law. That said, the idea behind the Accident Compensation 
Scheme is to provide cover even where tort law does not. 119 ) This 
rights which are not recognized in tort law may well be recognized 
under the ACA. Self-determination of women is recognized in a 
myriad of non-tort law situations: the possiblity of abortion in 
certain circumstances set out in the New Zealand Contraception, 
Sterilisation, and Abortion Act (1977), the English "wrongful 
birth" decisions and the right of access to family planning 
advice 120) indicate a strong tendancy to acknowledge this 
right. 121 ) The thrust of the law in these areas is that a woman has 
the right to decide whether or not she is to become pregnant and if 
necessary how she can prevent it. This right of self-determination 
is infringed the moment an unwanted pregnancy occurs. 
To subsume self-determination generally as a injury under the 
accident compensation scheme may, however, go too far. Therefore 
there is the requirement that the injury must be a personal one. 
That means the injury must refer to the bodily and mental integrity 
of the claimant. Pregnancy interferes with bodily integrity and can 
therefore be regarded as a personal injury. This approach to the 
issue is preferable because it seeks to satisfy both requirements 
for cover under the Act, "personal injury" and "medical 
misadventure as accident". 
d. Drug and Clinical Trials 
Before Green v Matheson there is only one other known decision 
which deals explicitly with an experimentation on a patient. In Re 
Kishor Bava Blair J. dismissed the appeal on the basis of Speight 
119 Vennell, Medical injury compensation under the New Zealand 
Accident Compensation Scheme, Professional Negligence 1989, 
141(143). 
120 Finlay/Sihombing, Family Planning and the Law, 2nd ed. Sydney 
(1978), p.3; Brazier, Medicine, Patients and the Law, 2nd ed. 
London (1992), p.373 et seq. (especially p.392). 
121 Compare also Bundesgerichtshof, BGHZ 86, 240- in Markesinis, 
Comparative Introduction to the German Law of Tort, Oxford 
(1986), p.99(104), where a right to plan a family as an 
emanation of the general right to one's personality was 
acknowledged. 
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J's decision in ACC v Auckland Hospital Board122 ) that medical 
misadventure cannot be interpreted so broadly as to include all 
undesired results of medical treatment even if it involves an 
element of experimentation. 123 ) His argument was that if that had 
been the intention of Parliament "different language would have 
been used 11 • 124 ) Dicta in Green v Matheson12 S) suggest that 
compensation under the ACA is allowable as medical misadventure for 
injuries relating to experiments on patients. 126 ) The circumstances 
which constitute medical misadventure in such cases could be for 
example the failure to obtain informed consent and the breach of a 
fiduciary duty. 127 ) 
3. CONCLUSION 
One can trace the development from a narrow interpretation of 
medical misadventure to a much broader one. Policy adjustments have 
probably signifacantly contributed to this development. A major 
consideration in the development of medical misadventure has been 
the severity of the injury and/ or the damage. 128 ) All in all the 
development has been successful in that the definition of medical 
misadventure under the ACA 1982 is one which can be worked with and 
which is quite predictable (Polansky v Acc l 29 ) aside ) . 
IV. Medical misadventure under the ARCI 1992 
1. DEFINITION OF MEDICAL MISADVENTURE 
Medical misadventure is defined in sect i on 5( 1) ARCI as: 
122 [1980) 2 NZLR, 748- see p.8. 
123 Re Kishor Bava [1983] NZACR, 669(673d). 
124 Re Kishor Bava [1983] NZACR, 669(673e). 
125 [1989) 3 NZLR, 564 (CA). 
126 Green v Matheson, [1989] 3 NZLR, 564(572 et seq.) 
127 Seen. above. 
128 "The Panel still considers the outcome of the decision not to 
operate to be extremely severe, and therefore recommends that 
the claim be accepted." - Galbraith v ACC, ACAA dec.317/92, 
p.12;" the adverse consequences have been greater than those 
normally expected in these cases "- McMullen v ACC, ACAA dee. 
220/92, p.5. 
129 See p.12. 
"personal injury resulting from medical error or medical mishap". 
The reference to personal injury within the definition could lead 
to the assumption that medical misadventure has become an 
autonomous term under the new Act, whereas under the ACA 1982 
"medical misadventure" only described one cause of personal injury. 
The different methods of defining "medical misadventure" in the two 
Acts are of no significance. The key concept under the ACA 1982 was 
"personal injury" and, due to section 8(2) ARCI, that remains the 
case. Section 8(2) states: 
"Cover under this Act shall extend to personal injury which-
(a) is caused by an accident to the person concerned; 
(c) is medical misadventure as defined in sections of this Act." 
Thus, cover under the 1992 Act is still dependant on proof of 
personal injury. Interestingly whereas the term "personal injury" 
was not defined in the ACA 1982, section 4 of the 1992 Act does set 
out a definition of that concept. We now turn to consider that 
concept. 
a. Personal injury 
Section 4(1) ARCI declares that personal injury means physical 
injuries. Mental injury is covered only if a person has previously 
suffered some physical injury. In contrast, the ACA 1982 provided 
cover for personal injury which was understood to include mental 
injuries130)_ Furthermore, compensation was granted for both 
physical and mental consequences of any such injury or of the 
accident (section 2(a)(i) ACA). The addition of the word physical 
in the ARCI is very important because it narrows the scope of the 
accident compensation scheme significantly131 l and opens up the 
field of non-physical injuries to litigation in the courts. 
A few areas arise which have to be dealt with in more detail 
because they are important with respect to the question as to 
whether cover for medical misadventure exists under the Act. 
130 Compare: Barnard, The Relationship between Compensation in 
Tort and the Accident Compensation System, [1990] NZ Recent 
Law Review, 162(171 with footnote 41). 
131 Compare: ACC v E, CA 247/91 (unreported). 
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even if one is not healthy that one has the right not to get worse 
and so it may be argued that the failure to diagnose and/or to 
treat is an infringement of this right. 1
36 ) In determining this 
issue the actual state the person was in and not in which (s)he 
could have been is important The next question then is whether the 
"injury" is a physical one. The underlying policy to have a 
definition for personal injury was to abolish the cover for mental 
injuries to a large extent. Therefore one has to see "physical" as 
a contrary to" mental "and therefore in the sense of bodily. The 
change for the worse of a diseased state is certainly a bodily 
injury. 
Consequently, a person who is a victim of a failure to diagnose 
correctly or a failure to treat suffers personal injury. 
cc) Secondary victims 
Another group which could perhaps be excluded from the cover of the 
ARCI are the secondary victims. When a person suffers an injury due 
to medical misadventure, (s)he gets cover under the ARCI. However, 
what about the spouse, children or other relatives who suffer 
nervous shock or other mental distress because of the injury of 
this person? 137 l Under the ARCI definition of personal injury the 
second person does not get cover because the mental injury suffered 
by that person is not an outcome of a physical injury to that 
person. 138 ) The question now arises as to whether the secondary 
victim has a remedy at all. There could be a major hurdle which 
136 Compare: Bison J. in MacDonald v ACC (1985) 5 NZAR, 276(279): 
"a certain physical state, whether good, bad or indifferent, 
which is adversely affected either by accident, which is 
fortune of one kind or by the treatment turning out badly 
despite all proper care and attention, which is bad fortune 
of another kind." 
137 Compare: ACC v F, [1990] 8 NZAR, 492(499) where Holland J. 
took the view that the indirect consequences on the mental 
health of those who were merely observers of accidents to 
another made it unlikely that Parliament intended such 
persons to be compensated. He decided that to be covered 
under the Act there must be some sort of physical injury to 
the person who seeks cover. This was overruled by the Court 
of Appeal in ACC v E, CA 147/91 p.16, where the Court states 
that "We see no other construction than that mental 
consequences of the accident are included within the term 
personal injury by accident whether or not there is also 
physical injury." 
138 Compare sec.4 ARCI. 
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will need to be overcome before a common law action can be 
commenced - section 14(1) ARCI. 
"No proceedings for damages arising directly or indirectly out of 
personal injury covered by this Act ... that is suffered by any 
person shall be brought in any Court in New Zealand independently 
of this Act, whether by that person or any other person, and 
whether under any rule of law or enactment." 
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The interpretation of this section is open to two possibilities. On 
the one hand, it could be argued that the secondary victim has 
suffered a personal injury which is not covered by the Act. 
Therefore his / her claim is not barred by section 14(1). On the 
other hand one could argue that the mental injury of the secondary 
victim arises at least indirectly out of the personal injury 
suffered by the primary victim. 139 ) The fact that the section 
includes "any person" and the phrase "whether by that person or any 
other person" is favourable for the second interpretation of the 
Act. The fact that the secondary victim would not have any remedy 
against a negligent health professional is a counter argument to 
this interpretation. In contrast, under the leading decision of the 
House of Lords in this area, McLaughlin v O'Brien, 140) a secondary 
victim of "negligent" medical misadventure would be most likely to 
have a chance of getting compensation under common law. 141 ) The 
argument that no compensation at all would be available bears more 
weight more than the ambiguous wording of the Act. To give the 
secondary victim a remedy against the negligent health professional 
only has a practical problem. The secondary victim could get more 
compensation under common law than the primary victim gets under 
ARCI. This result would be hardly fair and the Courts should 
consider the common law compensation on the basis of compensation 
the primary victim gets under ARCI. 
dd) Blood transfusion 
There have periodically been cases in which patients predominantly, 
due to religious grounds, refused to have a blood transfusion. It 
139 Tobin, Nervous Shock: The Common Law; Accident Compensation?, 
[1992] NZLJ, 282(287); compare also: Holland J. in ACC v F, 
[1990] 8 N_ZAR, 492(499). 
140 [1983] 1 AC, 410. 
141 See Tobin, Nervous Shock: The Common Law; Accident 
Compensation?, [1992] NZLJ, 282 et seq .. 
is questionable if someone who receives a blood transfusion which 
{s)he refuses suffers medical misadventure. An undesired blood 
transfusion is an infringement of the above mentioned right of 
bodily integrity. 142 ) It is also something what has to do with the 
body and therefore physicai. 143 ) Therefore an undesired blood 
transfusion can be a medical misadventure. However, it is highly 
doubtful that a person would get any compensation especially since 
lump sum payment has been abolished under ARCI. The only 
possibility would be punitive damages. 
ee) Sterilisation operation cases 
The failure of a sterilisation operation which results in a 
pregnancy is covered under the ARCI even so a pregnancy is a 
natural process and therefore not in itself a physical injury. 
However, as argued above 144 ) the woman's right of self-
determination is infringed "physically" if one interprets physical 
in the way it is proposed in this paper
14 5) because a pregnancy 
interferes bodily with the right of family planning. 
ff) Conclusion 
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The restriction of personal injury under the ARCI means a reduction 
of cover in comparison to the old Act and opens the way to the 
courts where negligence is involved but this is unlikely to cause 
major changes as most cases concerning medical misadventure will 
include physical injuries. It is important to interpret physical 
injury in the manner proposed in this paper: this approach ensures 
that there is consistency between the definition of personal injury 
and medical misadventure. 
b. medical error 
142 See above. 
143 See above. 
144 See p.18 et seq .. 
145 See above. 
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Medical error was a term used in Re E~ 146 ) The statutory definition 
used in the ARCI is nearly the same as used in Re E.
147 ) According 
to section 5(1) medical error means: 
"the failure of a registered health professional to observe a 
standard of care and skill reasonably to be expected in the 
circumstances. It is not medical error solely because desired 
results are not achieved or because subsequent events show that 
different decisions might have produced better results". 
Two points about the first sentence are noteworthy: first the 
definition clearly contains elements of negligence as shown by, 
"standard of care and skill reasonably to be expected". Second, 
whereas the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Bill 
made reference to "in the actual treatment"
148 ), the Act speaks of 
"in the circumstances". This change in wording suggests a desire to 
embrace both positive actions and acts of omission. 
It is questionable as to what meaning sentence 2 has. Although 
referring to the standard of care medical error does not literally 
mean the same as medical negligence. Situations which could 
generally be regarded as medical error are described in sentence 2, 
but are explicitly excluded from the meaning of medical error. This 
could mean that it is not a medical error if a situation falls into 
the meaning of sentence 2 even if it is due to negligence. This 
would be the case if sentence 2 was exclusionary. Consequently, 
this would lead to an enormous reduction of cases, which could be 
covered under the Act. Judging by the relationship of the clause to 
the use of the word "solely" in sentence 2 it must be concluded 
that sentence 2 should narrow the meaning of medical error to the 
meaning of medical negligence and therefore only has the function 
of clarifying this. Part one of sentence 2 also clarifies that not 
every undesired result is medical misadventure.
149 ) Sentence 2 also 
clarifies that the assessment of the standard of care must be made 
as at the time the registered health professional had to advise or 
act. The wisdom of hindsight is not to be used against him or 
her.150) 
146 Re E [1978] ACC Reports- July, p.44. 
147 Re E (1978] ACC Reports- July, p.44(46,47). 
148 Clause 4(1) Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation 
Insurance Bill. 
149 Compare: Speight J., ACC v Auckland Hospital Board (1980] 2 
NZLR, 748(751); see p.8. 
150 New Zealand Law Society Seminar, Accident Compensation- The 
New Legislation, July-August 1992, p.28 (3.72). 
Clearly medical error and medical negligence are, in effect, 
synonyms in section 5 ARCI. That, however, does not mean that the 
definition of medical misadventure under the ARCI is narrower than 
that in the ACA 1982. Cases which cannot be subsumed under medical 
error in section 5(1) can fall under medical mishap. 
c. medical mishap 
Medical mishap means an adverse consequence of treatment by a 
registered health professional, properly given, if -
(a) The likelihood of the adverse consequence of the treatment 
occurring is rare; and 
(b) The adverse consequence of the treatment is severe (section 
5(1)). 
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Medical mishap embraces, in contrast to medical error, all cases in 
which no negligent behaviour results in a personal injury. The only 
questionable factor is how to interpret the words "treatment 
properly given". Applying a generous interpretation of the term 
treatment it is possible to argue that this word itself does not 
say anything about acts or omissions and includes obtaining 
informed consent, information gathering, diagnosis and general 
advise. 151 ) If a narrower view would be correct, a patient who was 
adviced by his / her doctor to do something which causes a rare and 
severe adverse consequence, which would otherwise qualify for 
medical mishap, would not be covered at all. 
Adding the words "properly given" it cannot be doubted that this 
refers alone to actual treatment. 152 ) That means a failure to treat 
which is not negligent is not covered by the Act because it does 
not fall under medical mishap. What is then applicable to an 
incorrect but non negligent mis-diagnosis? Amis-diagnosis can lead 
to two different situations: First there may be a failure to treat. 
In this case there is no "treatment properly given" and therefore 
no medical mishap. Secondly, a mis-diagnosis can lead to a 
treatment, which is properly carried out but which has undesired 
results. The undesired result is not due to the properly given 
treatment but due to the mis-diagnosis. Because the properly given 
treatment caused an intended result there is no adverse consequence 
in accordance with the treatment. Therefore mis-diagnosis i n the 
151 Compare: New Zealand Law Society Seminar, Accident 
Compensation- The New Legislation, July - August 1992, p.28 
(3.76). 
152 This phrase was used in the Bill, compare: clause 4(1) ARCI 
Bill. It also indicates that there is no overlap between 
medical error and medical mishap. 
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second case also does not constitute medical mishap. Mrs.Polansky 
in the case Polansky v Acc 153) would not get any cover under the 
new Act because the mis-diagnosis of cancer was not due to 
negligence and the removal of her stomach and other organs was the 
consequence of a properly given treatment based on the premise that 
she had cancer. The exclusion of "non negligent" mis-diagnosis and 
failure to treat reflects the underlying opinion which was 
expressed by Blair J. in Re Collier154) that the patient in this 
case suffered only from the consequences of an underlying disease 
or bodily condition and therefore cover should be excluded.
155) 
These findings are supported by section 5(7) which expressly says 
that the failure to correctly treat due to a mis-diagnosis and the 
failure to treat at all do not give cover under the Act. It is one 
of the most significant limitations of cover for medical 
misadventure. 
In an attempt to get cover under the Act it is possible that 
victims will try to argue that the injury they have incurred is due 
to a positive act rather than to an omission. The Courts therefore 
could be forced in many instances to clearly distinguish between 
acts and omissions in medicine. 
It is questionable as to whether there is any other section of the 
ARCI which could provide cover for these situations. One 
possibility is section 8(2)(a) which states: 
"Cover under this Act shall extend to personal injury which is 
caused by an accident to the person concerned." 
The claimant would have to argue that a failure to treat or to 
diagnose correctly amounts to an accident. However, "accident" is 
defined in section 3(a) as: 
"A specific event or series of events that involves the application 
of a force or resistance external to the human body and that 
results in personal injury, but does not include any gradual 
process; . . . " 
Clearly. omissions do not meet the requirement of "external to 
human body". They are precisely the opposite. Thus, initially 
omissions are excluded from cover. 156 ) In sum, those who suffer 
153 Polansky v ACC [1990] 9 NZAR, 481. 
154 Re Collier (1976) 1 NZAR, 130(134). 
155 See sec.10. 
156 See Blair J. in Re Collier (1976) 1 NZAR, 130. 
personal injury by a non-negligent failure to treat or diagnose 
correctly are not covered under the 1992 Act and furthermore have 
no common law action available to them. 
The next point is that, a medical mishap as such does not 
constitute medical misadventure. In addition, two further 
requirements have to be fulfilled: The likelihood of the adverse 
consequence of the treatment must be rare and the adverse 
consequence must be severe. 
aa) Rare adverse consequences 
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According to section 5(2) the likelihood of the adverse consequence 
of the treatment is rare 
"if the probability is that the adverse consequence would not occur 
in more than 1 percent of cases where that treatment is given". 
An objective guide like this is helpful for those who are in charge 
of administering the scheme. Administrators are assisted by precise 
definitions enabling them to decide who, and to what extent a 
person has, cover under the Act. It is also able to provide 
information for those people who intend to enter into a contract 
with a private insurance company for risks not covered under the 
Act. 
As an argument for the necessity of an objective formula two cases 
are often used: Re Scholten where a 1.2% chance of an undesired 
result was held to be medical misadventure
157 ) and Re Gregg where a 
0.3% chance of an undesired result was held not to be sufficient to 
constitute medical misadventure. 15
8 ) As has been pointed out 
earlier159) the reason for the decisions, however, were not so much 
the percentages of the likelihood of an undesired result but rather 
the different approaches each judge took. The judges normally did 
not look only at the percentage of the likelihood under which an 
undesired result could occur but took other circumstances into 
account as well. Therefore it is difficult to maintain from the 
existing cases that without a legislative likelihood ratio the 
157 Scholten v ACC, ACAA dee. 146/89, p.7,8. 
158 Re Gregg, ACAA dee. 121/87, p.5. 
159 See p.11. 
judges would have come to unequal and unfair decisions. On the 
other hand it is most likely that every judge considers different 
percentages to be rare or not rare. A fixed percentage of 1%, 
however, raises the question of justice in the individual case. 
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In addition, it appears peculiar to have a difference between 
medical misadventure and other accidents,160) which are covered by 
the Act. Neither in the ACA 1982 nor in the ARC! has a distinction 
been made between rare and non rare consequences caused by work or 
car accidents, although it is a fact that on some streets more 
accidents occur than on others or that drivers of a special type of 
car on average have more accidents than others. Even more 
significant is the difference with regard to sports accidents. 161 ) 
Rugby, for example, is a sport where one can be sure that in almost 
every game there would be at least one accident, that is, rugby 
injuries would not be rare at all. There is no doubt, however, that 
these injuries are covered by the Act. 
Furthermore it is questionable as to what the basis of the proposed 
formula is. Section 5(2) speaks of "more than 1% of cases where 
that treatment is given". As the Medical Defence Union pointed out, 
published data on how frequently each individual adverse effect 
occurs in medical practice is rare162 J. 
Speight J. in ACC v Auckland Hospital Board, for example, stated 
that he could not rely on any percentages. 163 ) It was however 
160 Compare: Hughes, Informed Consent and Medical Injury, [1990] 
NZLJ, 154(154,156), where he gives an example for the fact 
that the introduction of medical misadventure had a 
restrictive effect; also Mahoney, Informed Consent and Breach 
of the Medical Contract to achieve a Particular Result, 
(1985-88) 6 Otago Law Review, 103(108). 
161 Sport injuries have always had a good position in the ACC 
system: The ACAA, for example, has awarded two sums of$ 
10.000 each plus on of$ 6.000 to an amateur sports person 
for injuries received while playing over several seasons- the 
reason behind that was that the injuries impacted upon the 
claimant's enjoyment of life and, in particular, the 
enjoyment received from playing sport. In contrast, a 
tetraplegic who suffers one catastrophic injury receives only 
the maximum of$ 10.000.- compare: McGreevy, Accident 
Compensation Reform- A Fairer Scheme or a Breach of 
Contract?, in Accident Compensation Reform Conference 
(materials), Wellington (1991), p.10. 
162 Collins, Submissions from the Medical Defense Union to 
Parliament's Select Committee on Labour concerning the 
Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Bill, 
Wellington (1992), p.9 - further Collins, Submissions .... 
163 ACC v Auckland Hospital Board [1980] 2 NZLR, 748(752). 
obvious that the consequences which had occurred were rare.164) In 
comparison, in MacDonald v Acc 165 ) a likelihood ratio existed. It 
was approximately 1%. Bisson J. did not take the approach of 
relying entirely on the likelihood percentage166) but this case 
would easily have been covered under the new Act. 
To refer solely to New Zealand statistics would be insufficient 
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because 3,5 million people do not provide sufficient data in 
relation to the quantity and variety of adverse consequences which 
occur. 167 ) The use of world-wide data or data collected in other 
countries could be an appropriate solution and normally is known by 
a physician when it has become recognised world-wide. The problem 
with this data, however, can be that its value is limited because 
the frequency of an adverse medical result can vary greatly 
depending upon the cross section of population used in the study. 
Factors which are also likely to influence the data on adverse 
consequences relating to medical treatment are the geographical 
location of the population from which the information is obtained, 
demography, the socio-economic standards of the community concerned 
(the standard of medical education varies across socio-economic 
groups) and the prevalence of a number of common diseases in the 
community studied. 168 ) Viggars v Acc 169 ) illustrates another 
problem: in that case two opposing medical opinions existed about 
the likelihood percentage of the occurred consequence. 170) 
It is submitted that where there is no data available, as in ACC v 
Auckland Hospital Board or the medical opinion regarding it is not 
unamious, as in Viggars v ACC, then the criminal law principle "in 
dubio pro reo" should be applied so that the likelihood of an 
adverse consequence is regarded as being under 1%. Progress could 
perhaps be achieved by shifting the burden of proof to the ACC, so 
that ACC has to proove that there was more than a 1% likelihood. 
Moreover, section 5(3) reads: 
"Where the likelihood that an 1nJury would occur is in the ordinary 
course rare, but is not rare having regard to the circumstances of 
164 ACC v Auckland Hospital Board [1980] 2 NZLR, 748(752). 
165 MacDonald v ACC [1985) 5 NZAR, 276. 
166 Compare: MacDonald v ACC [1985) 5 NZAR, 276(279). 
167 Compare the considerations of Dr. Williams in Legislation 
Advisory Committee, Submissions on ARCI Bill to the Labour 
Select Committee, Wellington (1992), p.7-appendix. 
168 Collins, Submissions ... , Wellington (1992), p.10. 
169 Viggars v ACC (1986) 6 NZAR, 235. 
170 Viggars v ACC (1986) 6 NZAR, 235(237). 
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the particular person, it shall not be medical mishap if the 
greater risk to the particular person injured -
(a) Was known to that person; or 
(b) In the case of a person who does not have legal capacity, was 
known to that person's parent, legal guardian, or welfare guardian, 
as the case be, -
prior to the treatment. 
A number of points are comment worthy. First, the section clearly 
indicates that the determination as to whether the adverse 
consequence is a rare one takes place from the patient's point of 
view. That means it is crucial for the 1% likelihood to be 
considered in the context of the particular patient. The question 
should not be to the online group of patients who undergo the 
particular procedure. Second, section 5(3) allows the patient who 
is interested and well informed about his or her health to be worse 
off than the disinterested and uninformed patient. This could lead 
to a situation where a doctor and patient could come to an 
understanding with it being more favourable for both doctor and 
patient if the patient was not informed about the treatment. This 
does not encourage the free-flow and exchange of information 
between doctor and patient. 
Besides that the problem is, what does knowledge of the "greater 
risk" mean? How much does the patient have to know - the full 
extent of the risk or merely that (s)he is more likely to suffer 
than the average patient? Most likely the question will be framed 
in terms of "the patient in the Clapham ambulance 11 • 171 ) 
This qualification also raises a fundamental philosophical 
question. Should those who are at greater risk of suffering an 
adverse outcome of treatment be prejudiced in their chances of 
recovering compensation simply because they are informed about the 
possibility of an adverse event before treatment? 
No commercial driver would lose his right to receive compensation 
for damages under the ARCI simply for the reason that he knew that 
he was at a high risk of getting involved in an accident. The same 
applies as well for a rugby player who knows that it is most likely 
that he or she will be injured during a game. In the author's view 
there is no obvious justification for the different treatment of a 
car driver or rugby player and a patient. 172 ) 
171 Compare: New Zealand Law Society Seminar, Accident 
Compensation - The New Legislation, July - August 1992, p.29 
(3.78). 
172 Compare: Legislation Advisory Committee, Submissions on ARCI 
Bill to the Labour Select Committee, Wellington (1992), p.5. 
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In the author's view it would have been preferable to introduce the 
1% formula as a general guideline instead of a manadatory statutory 
criterion. The judges and administrators should have been given the 
chance to view the individual circumstances of each case, with a 
statutory guideline provided. 
bb) Severe consequences 
The injury in question must furthermore be "severe" to receive 
cover under the ARCI. The requirement of severity must exist 
cumulatively to the requirement of a rare adverse consequence 
before the injury can be classified as medical misaventure. 
Severity is defined in section 5(4). That section reads: 
"the adverse consequence of treatment are severe only if they 
result in death or-
(a) Hospitalisation as an inpatient for more than 14 days; or 
(b) Significant disability lasting for more than 28 days in total; 
or 
(c) The person qualifying for an independence allowance under 
section 54 of this Act.[which means a disability of 10% or more 
after the AMA guide] 
The first two possibilities, death and hospitalisation seem to be 
clearly determinable. That said a causation problem could 
emerge. 173 ) In many cases there will be a combination of causes 
which contribute to death or hospitalisation. The question to be 
answered for the purpose of section 5(4) is what does "result" mean 
- is it sufficient to point to an indentifiable medical mishap 
which contributed to death or hospitalisation or must the mishap be 
the sole cause? Since in many cases there will be a lack of medical 
evidence on this point, it is submitted that it must be sufficient 
that the adverse consequence is only a contribution to the death or 
the hospitalisation. If not then there will be many patients who 
will receive nothing under the new regime, who would have been 
entitled to compensation under the old Act. Such an outcome would 
encounter to the Governments' stated policy that the new Act would 
not remove cover from those who would have been entitled under the 
old scheme. 
173 New Zealand Law Society Seminar, Accident Compensation - The 
New Legislation, July - August 1992, p.30 (3.82). 
The third possibility "significant disability", however, is not so 
clear: Disability is defined under section 3 of the Act as: 
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"any restriction or lack (resulting form impairmnent) of ability to 
perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered 
normal for a person." 
This definition does not raise any difficulties. Problematic, 
however, is the addition of "significant". Who will decide and how 
will it be decided what "significant" is? On its ordinary meaning 
"significant" is anything which for a particular individual has a 
substantial or unusual effect on their daily life. Significant" 
meters not only to the objective seriousness of the injury, but 
can also refer to the kind of injury and its negative effect on the 
particular individual. For a soccer professional a broken leg for 
28 days is a "significant disability" which disqualifies him or her 
from work, whereas it is not for a professional violinist. 
Leaving aside the notion of "significant disability" in section 
5(4)(b), let us turn to section 5(4)(c), the fourth possibility. 
That provision states that consequences of a treatment are severe 
only if the person qualifies for an independence allowance under 
section 54 of this Act. There are difficulties with this criterion. 
If we look to section 54 itself, we see that to qualify for an 
independence allowance the claimant must show that (s)he suffers 
from a minimum 10% degree of disability (section 54(1)). In 
determining the question of the "degree of disability", the Act in 
section 54(15) permits (and the ACC uses) the American Medical 
Association Guides to Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA 
Guides). This is where the difficulties begin. 
Professor Sir Kenneth Keith, President of the Law Commission, 
advised ACC doctors in 1988 to use the AMA Guide to rate 168 
randomly chosen persons who had received payments from the ACC. The 
average impairment was 10 , 5%. 174 ) The survey also showed that only 
32.1 % of the people had an impairment of 10% or more. 175 ) This can 
be interpreted as meaning that 67.9% of people who suffer from a 
non-negligently caused personal injury during a medical treatment 
are now excluded from ARCI compensation. One has however to 
consider that the group of 168 cases is a general example and 
174 Keith, Alternative Reform Options, Accident Compensation 
Reform Conference (materials), Wellington (1991), p.8. 
175 Keith, Alternative Reform Options, Accident Compensation 
Reform Conference (materials), Wellington (1991), appendix. 
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includes more than just medical misadventure cases. 176) There is so 
far no statistics available which only considers medical 
misadventure cases. Theoretically, it could be the case that the 
percentage of people who can get compensation under the new Act is 
even less than 32.1% if one only considers medical misadventure 
cases. 
In addition, the reference of the Act to the above mentioned AMA 
Guides in section 54(15) is far from clear. Does the 10% treshold 
mean whole-person impairment or organ-level impairment, such as the 
degree of impairment of the knee? The AMA Guides set out in several 
chapters how to measure for example a knee impairment, how to 
translate this data into percentage impairment of the lower 
extremity and how to translate this into a whole-person 
impairment. 177 ) According to section 54(15) it is possible for the 
ACC to extend or to modify the AMA Guides or even to use differing 
scales of measurement. A modification is needed in the author's 
view to avoid undesired results, as a highly skilled surgeon and a 
soccer professional receive the same amount of payment in the case 
of the loss of a thumb which hardly can be justified. 
In conclusion, the severity requirement is a difficult one which 
will only be fulfilled in a few cases. This will mean a significant 
reduction in compensation payments related to medical misadventure 
under the new Act. To prevent the worst, "significant" in section 
5(4)(c) should be interpreted in the way set out above. The ACC 
should also undertake to modify the AMA Guides as quickly as 
possible. One possibility so as to provide more victims with 
compensation, is to start with a more generous classification of 
impairments; this is allowed under section 54(15)(b). 
d. Registered health professional 
The definition of medical misadventure refers to the acts or 
omissions of a registered health professional. The phrase is 
defined in section 3 of the Act and means 
176 Compare: Legislation Advisory Committee, Submissions on the 
ARCI Bill to the Labour Select Committee, Wellington (1992), 
p.5 - further Legislation Advisory Committee, Submissions .... 
177 Compare: Pryor, A Critical Evaluation of the American Medical 
Association ' s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent 
Impairment, (1990) 103 Harv.L.Rev., 964(966). 
"(a) Any person who holds a current annual practising certificate 
issued by the Medical Council of New Zealand, the Nursing Council 
of New Zealand, the Chiropractic Board, the Dental Council of New 
Zealand, the Dental Technicians Board, the Occupational Therapy 
Board, the Pharmaceutical Society of New Zealand, or the 
Physiotherapy Board; or 
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(b) Any person registered with the Medical Laboratory Technologists 
Board, the Medical Radiation Technologists Board, or the 
Podiatrists Board". 
The definition excludes healers, herbalist and other people 
practising an alternative form of medical treatment unless these 
people are members of the stipulated organisations. This approach 
is to be commended for two reasons: first, the definition is clear 
as to what limits are covered by the Act; second, without this 
exclusion one would run the risk of everything which bore a slight 
resemblance to a treatment or was advertised as such to be turned 
into a medical one. On the other hand, the argument against the 
restriction to health professionals is that the definition excludes 
first aid situations where no doctor is available to render first 
aid. That said, those who suffer personal injury due to a first aid 
treatment could get cover under the Act by virtue of section 
8(2)(d). That section states: 
Cover under this Act shall extend to personal injury which is a 
consequence of treatment for personal injury. 
In first aid situations one normally helps someone who has a 
personal injury of one sort or another (excluded are only first aid 
treatments of mental injuries). Therefore this requirement is met. 
This view can also be strengthened by considering the fact that it 
is more encouraging for people to render first aid if they cannot 
be sued through common law. 
e. Conclusion 
Surprisingly, the definition of medical misadventure is a fall back 
to the definition given in Re E178 ) from 1978. The criticism of 
that decision, that the defintion was based on the Common law 
concepts of standard of care reasonably expected and forseeability 
178 Re E [1978) ACC Reports- July, p.44(46,47). 
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of the undesired result, also applies now. Negligencel79) now plays 
a major role in determining what constitutes medical misadventure 
under the 1992 Act. Due to the fact that the non-negligently caused 
failure to diagnose correctly and the non-negligent failure to 
treat fall outside the Act a significant number of all medical 
mistakes are not covered. Because severity of the injury must be 
shown only in a small number of cases can be achieved, the scope of 
the ARC! is significantly limited in the case of every action which 
is not negligent. In effect, this means, that the new Act in so far 
medical misadventure is concerned represents a codification of 
common law tort principles. The cases which would extend this are 
nearly all excluded. This effect could be avoided if, for example, 
an adverse consequence is assumed to be rare if there is no data 
available or if two different medical opinions about the likelihood 
exist. 180) Furthermore the requirement of a significant disability 
in section 5(4)(b) should be interpreted broadly181 ) and the ACC 
should undertake a modification of the AMA Guides as quickly as 
possible. 182 ) The exclusion of first aid treatment from medical 
misadventure does not play a major role. 
2. SPECIFIC EXCLUSIONS 
Section 5 also explicity states a number of exceptions which do not 
constitute medical misadventure. The aim of this paper is to 
examine each exception separately and consider whether the 
exceptions restrict medical misadventure further, beyond the 
definition discussed above, or if the exceptions are only a 
clarification of exclusions which result from the interpretation of 
the definition of medical misadventure discussed above. As the 
analysis shows, it is the view of the author that the exclusions 
are merely clarificatory and for this reason are essentially 
superfluous. Moreover, there may well be the added danger that 
judges and administrators will use the exclusions to interpret the 
generally expressed subsections of section 5. Such a result would 
be unfortunate. 
179 Intentional behaviour falls also under the Act because 
negligence is only a minimum requirement. 
180 See p.31. 
181 See p34. 
182 See p.35. 
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a. Abnormal reactions 
Section 5(5) says that 
"Medical misadventure does not include personal injury arising from 
abnormal reaction of a patient or later complication arising from 
treatment procedure unless medical misadventure occurred at the 
time of the procedure." 
To exclude personal injury arising from abnormal reaction of a 
patient from cover under the Act is quite unbelievable because 
normally that is considered as a classical case of medical 
misadventure. 183 ) The scope of abnormal reactions has been limited 
anyway because of section 5(2) and section 5(3).184) It is hard to 
think of cases which are not abnormal reactions and therefore left 
for section 5(2) and section 5(3). 
This "abnormal reactions" exception applies particularly to the use 
and administering of drugs during a medical treatment. Many drugs 
have known side effects. Others which are usually safe can affect 
particular persons adversely. These situations would normally fall 
under section 5(3) or are a matter of informed consent. There would 
have been no need to explicitly exclude them. The cases which are 
left, namely where an abnormal reaction is unforeseen, would, 
without this section, have to meet the requirements of medical 
mishap anyway, which are stringent enough. These few cases, 
however, seem to be completely excluded by section 5(5). 
Furthermore it is arguable that even abnormal reactions caused by 
negligence are exempted from cover due to section 5(5). Much 
depends on the the interpretation of the scope of the last half 
sentence of section 5(5) "unless medical misadventure occurred at 
the time of the procedure". If this provison were to apply to 
abnormal reactions it would mean that even negligent prescriptions 
or administration of drugs which cause an abnormal reaction would 
not be covered under the Act. This would clearly go too far. 
Therefore it is arguable that the last part of the sentence has to 
be read together with the first part. Cases which would be related 
to medical mishap are possibly excluded from cover because it is 
hard to conceive of a medical mishap which occurs and which does 
not cause an abnormal reaction. 
183 Compare: Claims Manual 1991, 4.2.4 .. 
184 See IV.l.c.aa. 
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The second provision of section 5(5) is that medical misadventure 
does not include later complications arising from treatment unless 
medical misadventure occurred at the time of the procedure. This 
provision is just a clarification. Indeed, there are hardly any 
cases where a complication arises from treatment where the cause of 
the complication does not lie in the treatment. That situation, 
however, can be subsumed under the above discussed definition of 
medical misadventure. When, for example, after an operation the 
wound is not tended to satisfactorily due to negligence and results 
in an infection then one can subsume this situation easily under 
medical error. The cause of the infection is not the operation but 
the omission to tend the wound. Therefore there could seem to be 
little reason for this provision. 
Besides that, the provision contains an interpretation problem: 
what does later complications mean? How much later is later? It has 
to be taken into consideration that it takes a different time for 
different abnormal reactions to occur. Therefore one should judge 
every case individually. 
Section 5(5), which was inserted by the select committee, remains 
somewhat dubious. On the one hand it excludes a classical case of 
medical misadventure almost completely. On the other hand it only 
clarifies a well-known fact in its second part. The subsuming of 
abnormal reactions under the requirements of medical mishap and 
medical error would mostly have been excluded from cover. There is 
no obvious reason for excluding them as a whole. Cases such as Re 
Lloydl85) or Re Kishor Bava186) will clearly not be medical 
misadventure on any interpretation of the 1992 Act. 187 ) 
b. Failure to obtain informed consent 
In its submissions to the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation 
Insurance Bill the Medical Defence Union expressed concern about 
the "unqualified and indiscriminate use" of the term "informed 
consent". 188) The Union presented three possible definitions, which 
ranged from an objective standard relating to the medical 
185 [1982] NZACR, 259. 
186 [1983] NZACR, 690. 
187 Compare also: Vennell/Manning, Accident Compensation, [1992] 
NZ Recent Law Review, 1(5). 
188 Collins, Submissions ... , Wellington (1992), p.12. 
profession, via an objective standard which related to the patient 
and finally to a patient's objective/ subjective standard.189) 
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The objection of the Medical Defence Unionl90) to the Bill relating 
to the fact that failure to obtain informed consent from the 
patient was beyond the scope of medical misadventurel91) was taken 
into account so far, that the failure to obtain informed consent to 
treatment is, according to section 5(6) medical misadventure if the 
health professional acts negligently in failing to obtain informed 
consent. Informed consent itself is not defined in the Act. It is 
questionable as to what the patient has to be informed about and 
therefore, when it is negligent not to disclose possible side-
effects or outcomes of the treatment. In effect, excluded from the 
Act's cover are situations where there has been a failure to obtain 
informed consent, but in circumstances amount less than 
negligence.This exclusion Eeems to reflect the outcome of H v 
ACc. 192 ) and establish the Sidaway test as decisive. 
Whether this is correct or not could depend on the effect of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Section 6 of the Act states 
that it is preferable that every term in an enactment should be 
given a meaning consistent with the Bill of Rights Act. Section 11 
of the 1990 Act states: 
"Everyone has the right to refuse to undergo any medical 
treatment". 
It is arguable that a patient only can exercise his or her right 
under section 11 if he or she has knowledge of all the 
circumstances and can make a free choice whether or not to undergo 
medical treatment. In the light of section 11 of the Bill of Rights 
Act it is preferable to define what a doctor should disclose to his 
or her patient, as information which would be desirable by a 
prudent and responsible patient. 193 ) The information must be given 
in the language of the patient, and the explanations must take into 
account, with respect to the patient's level of knowledge, 
189 Collins, Submissions ... , Wellington (1992), p.12,13. 
190 Collins, Submissions ... , Wellington (1992), p.13. 
191 Clause 4(5) Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation 
Insurance Bill. 
192 H v ACC [1990] 8 NZAR, 289; see p.16. 
193 Compare patient's objective standard in: Collins, 
Submissions ... , Wellington (1992), p.13. 
understanding and circumstances. This approach is significantly 
different from the Sidaway definition of informed consent. 
c. Failure to diagnose/ failure to provide treatment 
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One of the most significant limitations in the new definition is 
the exclusion of cover for those who are not diagnosed correctly, 
or who do not receive treatment when both cases are not due to 
negligence - section5(7). Failure to diagnose and treat constitutes 
an enormous amount of all medical mistakes.19 4) There can be little 
doubt that a number of patients who have received compensation 
under the ACA 1982 are now excluded from cover. This exclusion is 
superfluous because it also results from the definition of medical 
mishap and medical error. 195) As shown earlier a failure to 
diagnose or a failure to treat can only be understood as "medical 
misadventure" if there is negligence involved. Subsection 7 adds 
nothing. 
d. Drug or clinical trial 
Finally, section5(8) excludes the carrying out of any drug trial or 
clinical trial from the scope of medical misadventure where the 
person has agreed in writing to participate in the trial. In some 
ways this exclusion can be regarded as superfluous, because if a 
patient does not know that (s)he takes part in a tria1 196 ), (s)he 
has not given informed consent and, as we have seen already 
informed consent is addressed in section 5(6). If a patient has 
knowledge of his or her participation in a drug or clinical trial 
(s)he normally can be assumed to have known of a higher risk which 
already falls within the scope of the exclusion in section 5(3). 
The written clause only expresses a higher standard of informed 
consent. If a person takes part in a drug or clinical trial it can 
be assumed that a prudent and reasonable doctor would wish to 
obtain an appropriate level of informed consent - it would seem 
obvious to the author tha this would mean as minimum that the 
consent be set out in writing. 
194 Collins, Submissions ... , Wellington (1992), p.13. 
195 See IV.l.b.; IV.l.c .. 
196 Compare: Green v Matheson [1989) 3 NZLR, 564. 
However, the explicit exception of drug and clinical trials makes 
certain that in an increasing field of modern medical law there is 
no claim for compensation under a non-fault scheme. 
e. Conclusion 
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The specific exceptions to medical misadventure made in section 
5(5) to 5(8) do not contribute to the simplification and the 
comprehension of medical misadventure. Sometimes the exceptions are 
superfluous because they are only a clarification ( eg. section 
5(7) ) or they are not complete as in section 5(6) where a 
definition of informed consent is missing. Section 5(5) can be 
regarded as completely ill-conceived. 
3. CONCLUSION 
The development of the ARCI resulted in a restriction of 
compensation within a medical treatment framework. Although the 
administration of justice had almost overcome the concept of the 
standard of care and foreseeability under the old Act and the 
accident compensation scheme had acquired a prominent position 
world-wide, nevertheless a relapse back to common law is now 
evident. A particulary dramatic factor in this phenomenon is the 
exclusion of mis-diagnosis and failure to treat when they occur 
non-negligently. As the analysis shows, the specific exclusions in 
section 5 are merely clarificatory and for this reason are 
essentially superfluous. Since life is often of a much more diverse 
nature than the legislator can perceive, it would have been 
preferable if care had been taken to form a principled definition 
rather than trying to legislate for unique and individual cases. 
The restriction of compensation in the case of medical misadventure 
is incomprehensible, particularly in view of background facts such 
as that between 1990 and 1991 medical misadventure cost a mere $5 
million, which amounts to 0.5% of the whole ACC payout. 197) 
The Government stressed in the preparatory report 198 l that it would 
continue to adhere to the principles stated in the Woodhouse 
197 Compare: Legislation Advisory Committee, Submissions ... , 
Wellington (1992), p.3. 
198 Minister of Labour, Accident Compensation: A Fairer Scheme, 
Wellington (1991), p.15. 
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Report. 199 ) One of these basic principles is that the corrununity has 
a responsibility to help injured persons irrespective of any 
question of fault or liability. With the enactment of the new 
definition of medical misadventure in the 1992 Act, the Government 
has failed to adhere to this promise. 
v:·. Keeping the medical profession in line 
One point of criticism has long been that the old Act does not have 
a deterrent element in it. 200) This has changed under the ARC!. 
Section 5(10) imposes a duty on the Corporation to refer any 
medical misadventure claim it considers to be caused by "negligence 
or inappropriate action" to an appropriate disciplinary body. In 
addition, the registered health professional can be punished 
through the levy imposed on him/her to fund the accident 
compensation scheme. 20l) The doctor can get a no claim bonus or on 
the other hand has to pay increased premiums. 
The Act excludes in section 14(1) 202) actions for compensatory 
damage in common law arising directly or indirectly out of personal 
injury against the perpetrator (although common law actions would 
may be the best deterrents. 203)) More accurately, no proceeding for 
compensatory damages which arises (directly or indirectly ) out of 
"personal injury" covered by the Act can be litigated. Since 
medical misadventure is a form of personal injury "covered" by the 
1992 Act 204) medical misadventure suits cannot be brought before 
any court in New Zealand. 
Because negligent acts or omissions are covered under the Act there 
are basically no cases left where the patient can sue the doctor 
under corrunon law. Exemptions are cases where the patient only 
suffered mental injury or is a secondary victim. 205) Consequently 
the new scheme is an entire replacement of the tort law. In any 
199 Legislation Adivsory Committee, Submissions ... , Wellington 
(1992), p.5. 
200 Giesen, International Malpractice Law, Tilbingen (1988), 
p.540- footnote 88, Auckland District Law Society, The New 
Accident Compensation Legislation, Auckland (1992), p.7. 
201 Section 122 et seq. ARC!. 
202 See appendix. 
203 Compare: Cane, Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation and the Law, 
4th ed. London (1987), p.546. 
204 See: section 8(2)(c). 
205 See IV.1.a.aa.; IV.1.a.cc. 
instance where the scheme were to extend tort law the Act 
presupposes such stringent requirements, that the range of 
application for the area of non-negligent accidents is seriously 
restricted. That means that the policy which ACC has stood for in 
the past, for example, community responsiblity and comprehensive 
entitlement is not accomplished under the new Act. The medical 
profession could still almost be completely protected from common 
law claims. 
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Nevertheless, it had been argued that besides cover under the ACA 
1982 206) the patient could have an action based on breach of 
contract. 207 ) The main argument has been that the damage suffered 
if a contractual promise to achieve a particular result with a 
medical treatment is breached is different from a suffered personal 
injury and does not arise directly or indirectly out of a suffered 
personal injury. 208) The reason for this is that the focus in a 
breach of contract case is on the failure to achieve the result 
bargained for, regardless of why that result was not achieved. In 
other words, it is mere coincidence that the result of the 
treatment can be classified as both a breach of contract and a 
personal injury. An even stronger argument for the existence of a 
breach of contract action alongside compensation under the ACA was 
advanced in Donselaar v Donselaar. There it was stated that the 
idea underlying the accident compensation scheme is to replace tort 
law. 209) In reverse, the object of the accident compensation scheme 
was certainly not to abolish actions for breach of contract. 
Therefore it would be unfair to let the Act serve as a shield for 
206 Sec.27(1): "Subject to this section, where any person 
suffers personal injury by accident in New Zealand or dies as 
a result of personal injury so suffered, or where any person 
suffers outside New Zealand personal injury by accident in 
respect of which he has cover under this Act or dies as a 
result of personal injury so suffered, no proceedings for 
damages arising directly or indirectly out of the injury or 
death shall be brought in any Court in New Zealand 
independently of this Act, whether by that person or any 
other person, and whether under any rule of law or any 
enactment." 
207 Mahoney, Informed Consent and Breach of the Medical Contract 
to achieve a Particular Result, 6 [1985-88] Otago Law Review, 
103(126 et seq.). 
208 Mahoney, Informed Consent and Breach of the Medical Contract 
to achieve a Particular Result, (1985-88) 6 Otago Law Review, 
103(128). 
209 Donselaar v Donselaar [1982] 1 NZLR (CA), 97(104 et seq.); 
compare: Palmer, Compensation for Incapacity, Wellington 
(1979), p.271 et seq .. 
doctors against breach of contract claims when it was never the 
purpose of the scheme to interfere with contractual relations. 
45 
The counterargument to this has been that the damage arises 
directly or indirectly from medical misadventure.210) Collins saw 
that while a distinction can be made between breaching a term of a 
contract and the results which follow, ultimately any act against a 
doctor who fails to achieve a particular medical result must 
inevitably be a claim for damages which arise directly or 
indirectly from medical misadventure. 
In the author's view, Collins' view is wrong. The emphasis should 
not lie on "damages arising directly or indirectly out of the 
injury". Instead the emphasis should lie on "personal injury 
suffered by accident". Compensation for breach of contract is 
claimed, because a contractual term has not been carried out 
properly211 ) and not because someone suffered personal injury, 
though both exist on the same set of facts. Consequently, in the 
author's view claims for breach of contract were not barred by 
section 27 ACA 1982. 
The new Act attempted to clarify this point. Section 14(3) states 
that: 
"Nothing in this section shall apply to any proceedings relating 
to, or arising from,-
(b) any express term of any contract or agreement," 
If this provision had not been included it is likely that breach of 
contract actions would not have been open, because of section 14(1) 
of the 1992 Act. It will be recalled that proceedings related to 
personal injury covered by the Act are prohibited. Since personal 
injuries which are caused by medical misadventure are "covered" by 
the Act, actions on the contract would be barred - they would be 
proceedings in relation to personal injury covered by the Act. It 
should be noted, however, that for section 14(3) to apply, the 
terms relating to the desired outcome must be express. Moreover, 
patients, partly where the contract is oral, may face evidentrary 
difficulties. The courts often have seen what might have been a 
210 Mahoney, Informed Consent and Breach of the Medical Contract 
to achieve a Particular Result, (1985-88) 6 Otago Law Review, 
103(129); Collins, Medical Law in New Zealand, Wellington 
(1992), p.178: As a source for this argument Collins refers 
to Green v Matheson ( [1989] 3 NZLR, 564 ). In the author's 
view no conclusion for the handling of claims for breach of 
contract can be drawn from this decision. 
211 Smith/Keenan, English Law, 9th ed. London (1989), p.307. 
guarantee of a particular result as a merely therapeutic 
reassurance.212) 
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Nevertheless, in addition to the exception of section 14(3) ARCI, 
actions for exemplary damages at common law may still be 
brought. 213 ) Actions for exemplary damages are, however, reserved 
for cases in which the court believes the perpetrator's outrageous 
conduct should be punished. Exemplary damages therefore do not aim 
to compensate a victim and do not arise directly or indirectly from 
the injury which the victim suffers. 214 ) However, exemplary 
damages can help to keep the medical profession in line. 
VI . Resume 
From 1974 until 1992 the evolution of what does and what does not 
constitute medical misadventure outlines policy orientated legal 
development which was based on the idea of community responsiblity 
set out in the Woodhouse Report. The outcome of this development 
has been rather successful and the definition of medical 
misadventure under the ACA 1982 has been one with which one could 
have worked and which possessed a certain amount of legal clarity 
and contributed to legal security. 215 ) This definition had overcome 
the common law concepts of standard of care and foreseeability. 
In the definition of medical misadventure in the ARCI however a 
relapse back to the common law concept of negligence is apparent. 
The requirements to get cover for accidents where negligence is not 
involved are so stringent that not many patients will get cover 
under the Act for non-negligent acts (including acts of omission). 
One of the most disturbing factors about the new Act is the 
exclusion of mis-diagnosis and failure to treat when they occur 
non-negligently because now a significant number of all medical 
"mistakes" are not covered. 216 ) On the other hand there are 
212 Mahoney, Informed Consent and Breach of the Medical Contract to achieve a Particular Result, (1985-88) Otago Law Review, 
103(127). 
213 Donselaar v Donselaar [1982] 1 NZLR, 97; Auckland City Council v Blundell (1986] 1 NZLR, 732(739) (CA). 
214 Donselaar v Donselaar (1982] 1 NZLR, 97; Green v Matheson [1989] 3 NZLR, 564(571) (CA). 
215 See p.20. 
216 See p.27,28. 
normally no common law remedies available when there is no 
negligence and an action for exemplary damages will most likely be 
not possible by non-negligent acts. A claim for a breach of 
contract is only available under section 14(3).217) 
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The new definition of personal injury, however, which restricts it 
to physical injuries. will not have a great impact of the cover for 
medical misadventure if one interprets physical injury in the way 
this paper proposes. 218 ) Nevertheless, this definition opens the 
way to common law claims where negligence is involved for cases 
where the patient suffers only mental injury, or gets pregnant 
after a failed sterilisation operation, or is a secondary 
victim. 219 ) 
The aim of the legislator, to create a comprehensive definition of 
medical misadventure failed because of rather confusing 
"clarification" provisions and the inconsistency with especially 
the definition of personal injury. It would have been preferable if 
the legislator would have formed a comprehensive definition rather 
than trying to categorize individual -and unique cases, especially, 
since the new definition shows rather weak terms which can be 
interpreted in different ways. To avoid major damage, an adverse 
consequence should be assumed to be rare if there is no data 
available or two different medical opions about the likelihood 
exist. 22 0) Furthermore the requirement of a significant disability 
in section 5(4)(b) should be interpreted broadly221 ) and the ACC 
should undertake a modification of the AMA Guides as quickly as 
possible. 222 ) 
The Government did not keep its promises. The new scheme is not 
fairer it imposes more stringent requirements on the victim of 
medical misadventure to get cover under ARCI than on other accident 
victims.223) Furthermore a significant number of cases which would 
have been eligible for compensation under the old Act are not 
eligible under the new Act. The new Act does not adhere to the 
principle of community responsiblity set out in the Woodhouse 
Report anyrnore. There is no obvious reason for the restriction. The 
limitation of cover in the case of medical misadventure is 
incomprehensible, particularly in view of background facts such as 
217 See p.45 et seq. 
218 See p.22 et seq. 
219 See IV.l.a.aa.; IV.l.a.cc. 
220 See p.31. 
221 See p.34,et seq. 
222 See p.35. 
223 See p.30. 
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that between 1990 and 1991 medical misadventure caused a payment of 
$ 5 million, which means only 0.5% of the whole ACC payment. 224 ) 
The medical misadventure provision in the ARCI is basically a 
rewriting of the law of negligence with little extension. 
224 Legislation Advisory Committee, Submissions on ARCI Bill to 
the Labour Select Committee, Wellington (1992), p.3. 
Appendix 
Accident Compensation Act 1982 
1560 A.cadent Comper.Jaczor, 1982. '.\ o. 181 
of the period , or with the person ' s sooner complete 
reco,·ery from incapacity due to the accident. or with 
his death : 
' ·Person", in relation to any emplo:c:r. includes a 
company or other body corporate. whether incorpo-
rated in ~ew Zealand or elsewhere. and a public 
body; and also includes an unincorporated body of 
persons, a partnership, an association of persons 
carrying on a joint undertaking, and the Crown, and 
a Government department: 
7'Personal injury by accident"-
(a) lncludes-
(i) The physical and mental consequences of 
any such injury or of the accident : 
(ii) Medical, surgical, dental, or first aid 
misadventure: 
(iii) Incapacity resulting from an occupational 
disease or industrial deafness to the 
extent that cover extends in respect of 
the disease or industrial deafness under 
sections 28 and 29 of this Act: 
(iv) Actual bodily harm (including pregnancy 
and mental or nervous shock) arising by 
any act or omission of any other person 
which is within the description of any of 
the offences specified in sections 128, 
132, and 201 of the Crimes Act 1961, 
irrespective of whether or not any 
person is charged with the offence and 
notwithstanding that the offender was 
legally incapable of forming a criminal 
intent: 
(b) Except as provided in the last preceding 
paragraph, does not include--
(i) Damage to the body or mind caused by a 
cardio-\·ascular or cerebro-,·ascular 
episode unless the episode is the result of 
effort, strain. or stress that is abnormal. 
excessive. or unusual for the person 
suffering it. and the effort . strain . or 
stress arises out of and in the course of 
the employmenr of that person: 
(ii ) Damage to the body or mind caused 
exclusively by disease. infection. or the 
ageing process: 
Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 
4. Definition of "penonal injury"-(1 ) For the purpor 
?~ t~ Act, "personal injury" means the death of, or physi 
U1Junes to, a person, and any mental injury suffered by , 
person which is an outcome of those physical injuries to 
person, and has the extended meaning assigned to it by section 
8 (3) of this Act. 
(2) For the purposes of this Act, no cardio-vascular or 
cerebra-vascular episode shall be regarded as personal injury 
unless-
(a) It is a result of medical misadventure; or 
(b) It is a work injury by vinue of section 6 ( l ) of this Act. 
Cf. 1982, No. 181 , s. 2 (1) 
5. Definition of "medical misadventurc"-(1) For the 
purposes of this Act, -
"Medical error" means the failure of a registered health 
professional to observe a standard of care and skill 
reasonably to be expected in the circumstances. It is 
not medical error solely because desired results are 
not achieved or because subsequent events show that 
different decisions might have produced better 
results: 
"Medical misadventure" means personal injury resulting 
from medical error or medical mishap: 
"Medical mishap" means an adverse consequence of 
treatment by a registered health professional, 
properly given, if-
(a) The likelihood of the adverse consequence of 
the treatment occurring is rare; and 
(b) The adverse consequence of the treatment is 
severe. 
(2) For the purposes of the definition of the term "medi: al 
mishap", the likelihood that treatment of the kind that 
occurred would have the adverse consequence shall be rare 
only if the probability is that the adverse consequence would 
not occur in more than l percent of cases where that treatment 
is given. · 
(3) Where the likelihood t~ac an injury w~uld occur is in the 
ordinary course rare, bu_t IS not rare _haVIng regard co _che 
circumstances of the pamcular person, 1t shall not be med1Cal 
mishap if the greater risk to the particular person injured-
(a) Was known to chat person; or 
(b) In the case of a person who does not have legal capacity, 
was known to that person 's parent, legal guardian, or 
welfare guardian, as the case may be,-
prior to the treatment. 
B 
Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation 13 
Insurance 
(4) For the purposes of the definition of the term "medical 
mishap", the adverse consequences of treatment are severe 
only if they result in death or-
(a) Hospitalisation as an inpatient for more than 14 days; or 
(b) Significant disability lasting for more than 28 days in total; 
or 
(c) The person qualifying for an independence allowance 
under section 54 of this Act. 
(5) Medical misadventure does not include personal injw-y 
arising from abnormal reaction of a patient or later 
complication arising from treatment procedures unless medical 
misadventure occurred at the time of the procedure. 
(6) A failure to obtain informed consent to treatment from 
the person on whom the treatment is performed or that 
person's parent, legal guardian, or welfare guardian, as the case 
may be, is medical misadventure only if the registered health 
professional acted negligently in failing to obtain informed 
consent. 
(7) Medical misadventure does not include a failure to 
diagnose correctly the medical condition of any person or a 
failure to provide treatment unless that failure is negligent. 
(8) Medical misadventure does not include any personal 
injw-y resulting from the carrying out of any drug trial or 
clinical trial where the injured person has agreed in writing to 
panicipate in the trial. 
(9) In making any decision under this section the Corporation 
shall obtain and have regard to independent advice in 
accordance with procedures prescribed by regulations made 
under this Act. 
( 10) Where the Corporation considers that medical 
misadventure may be attributable to negligence or an 
inappropriate action on the pan of a registered health 
professional it shall-
(a) Give the registered health professional a reasonable 
opportunity to comment on the matter; and 
(b) If satisfied that there may have been negligence or 
inappropriate action-
report the circumstances to the appropriate body with a view 
to the institution of disciplinary proceedings, and to any other 
body that may be appropriate. 
6. Definition of "work. injury"-(1 ) For the purposes of 
this Act, "work injury", in relation to any person, means 
personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment 
C 
Relationship with Other Rights 
14. Application of Act excludes other rights-(!) No 
proceedings for damages arising directly or indirectly out of 
per~onal injury covered by this Act or personal injury by 
accident covered by the Accident Compensation Act 197 2 or 
the Accident Compensation Act 1982 that is suffered by any 
r.son shall be brought in any Court in New Zealand 
mdependently of this Act, whether by that person or any other 
person, and whether under any rule of law or any enactment. 
(2) For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that 
nothing in this section shall be affected by-
(a) The failure or refusal of any person to lodge a claim for 
any treatment, service, rehabilitation, related 
transport, compensation, grant, or allowance under 
this Act or those Acts; or 
(b) Any ~urported denial or surrender by any person of any 
nghts under this Act or those Acts; or 
(c) The fact that a person who has suffered personal injury 
covered by this Act or personal injury by accident 
covered by the Accident Compensation Act 19 7 2 or 
the Accident Compensation Act 1982 is not entitled 
to any treatment, service, rehabilitation, related 
transport, compensation, grant, or allowance under 
this Act. 
(S) Nothing in this section shall apply to any proceedings 
relating to, or arising from,-
(a) Any damage to property; or 
(b) Any express term of any contract or agreement; or 
(c) The wijustifiable dismissal of any person or any other 
personal grievance arising out of a contract of 
employment; but no compensation for personal 
injury covered by this Act or personal injury by 
accident covered by the Accident Compensation Act 
1972 or the Accident Compensation Act 1982 shall be 
awarded in any such proceedings. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall prevent the bringing of any 
proceedings for damages in any Court in New Zealand in 
respect of the personal injury or personal injury by accident 
suffered by any person, in New Zealand or elsewhere, if the 
cause of action is any liability for damages under the law of 
New Zealand pursuant to any international convention relating 
to the carriage of passengers. 
(5) Where, in any proceedings before a Court, a question 
arises as to whether or not any person has suffered personal 
injury covered by this Act, or personal injury by accident 
covered by the Accident Compensation Act 197 2 or the 
Accident Compensation Act 1982 or has died as a result of 
personal injury or personal injury by accident so suffered, no 
determination shall be made by the Court unless the 
Corporation is a party to the proceedings or is given an 
opportwiity to be heard. 
(6) Nothing in this section shall affect any proceedings in 
respect of personal injury to which this Act applies by virtue of 
section 11 of this Act. 
Cf. 1982, No. 181, ss. 27, 86 
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